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REGULATION OFHMOs UNDER STATE FIDUCIARY
COMMON LAW
A. Medical Practice and the Obligations of the
Treating Physician
B. Medical Practice and Obligations of Medical
.
Directors
C. Damages for Breach of Common Law Fiduciary
Duty
1. Equitable Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court announced its unanimous verdict in Pegram
v. Herdrich, 1 a case c oncerning the rights of a plaintiff to sue an H eal th
Maintenance Organization (HM0)2 in federal court under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),3 the media haled it

a

victory for the managed care industry.4 The plaintiff, Cynthia Herdrich,
alleged that the HMO bribed its physicians with a financial incentive plan
that induced them to deny her needed care to save the plan money.5 She
sued the HMO for breaching its BRISA fiduciary duty.6 In finding for the
defendant HMO, the Court held that the HMO was not the BRISA plan and
that its medical treatment decisions were not governed by BRISA fiduciary

1. 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
2. Health Maintenance Organization, is an insurance business structure for reimbursing the

cost of medical services. While the generally accepted
term is MCO (managed care organization)
this paper will follow the Supreme Court's use
of HMO.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2000).
4. Jane Crawford Greenbu rg Court Spares HMO from US Suits,
CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2000,
at
("In a resounding victory for the managed care industry,
the U.S. S upreme Court
u nani�ously ruled Monday that a former
legal secretary could not use a federal law to sue her
Ilhno1s HMO for offering its physicians
financial incentives to keep down costs.").
5. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2147
.
,

A�

.

6.

Id.
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duty provisions.7 HMO stocks immediately soared8 because the Court's
opinion took notice that while there are risks associated with rationing
medical care,9 "no HMO organization could survive without some
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing." 1° Further,
the court was not prepared to adjudicate the wis9om of medical care
rationing.11 The Court's language clearly removes the threat of ERISA
fiduciary liability for managed care decisionmaking.12
While Pegram is the first decision by the Supreme Court to directly
consider a plaintiffs claim that the routine business practices of the HMO
industry violated ERISA's standards for fiduciary conduct, 13 we question

7. Id. at 2151.
8. High court rules patients cannot use federal law to sue HMOs over doctor bonuses.
www.kcsw.com 6/13/00 (Cigna jumped 21/4 to 903/4. Aetna, which was upgraded by SaJomon
Smith Barney on Monday, rose 3114 to 705/8.). Cf Bruce Jaspen, Illinois HMO Profits Ailing, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 1, 1999, at Bl (noting that HMO profitability was depressed for severaJ reasons
including failure to control costs).
9. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2150 ("rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others
(ruptured appendixes are more likely; unnecessary appendectomies are less so)").
10. Id.
11. Id. ("[A]ny legaJ principle purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would
embody, in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medicaJ risk. A valid conclusion of this sort
would, however, necessarily tum on facts to which courts would probably not have ready access:
correlations between malpractice rates and various HMO models, similar correlations involving fee
for-service models, and so on.").
12. Pegram has far reaching business implications because virtually all of the medical
insurance provided by employers is covered by ERISA. An important exception includes medical
insurance coverage for workmen's compensation and church plans. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003 (1997).
Coverage (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and in sections 201, 301, and
401 [29 USCS §§ 1051, 1081, and 1101), this title shaJI apply to any employee
benefit plan if it is established or maintained-( I) by any employer engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any
employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both. (b)
The provisions of this title shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if-(1)
such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 3(32) [29 uses §
1002(32)]); (2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in § 3(33) [29 uses §
1002(33)]) with respect to which no election has been made under section 410(d)
of the lnternaJ Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 410(d)]; (3) such plan is
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's
compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws;
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the benefit
of persons substantiaJly all of whom are nonresident aliens; or (5) such plan is an
excess benefit plan (as defined in§ 3(36) [29 USCS § I 002(36)]) and is unfunded.

29 u.s.c.s. § 1003 (1997).
13. No Supreme Court case has thus far addressed the issue of bodily injury or wrongful
deat h arising from the administrative malfeasance of an ERISA plan. Several such cases have been
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FWRIDA L4 W REVIEW

4

whether the stock market analysts

are

correct that the Sup reme Court has

immunized HMO business practices. It is the premise of this Article that
in its holding, the Pegram Court also removed the ERISA preemption bar
.
to state law claims for medical malp r actic e and breach of state fiduciary
law. Paradoxically then, although the defendant HMO in Pegram won, the
managed care industry lost.

In Part II, we review how the HMO industry was initially able to mold
ERISA's preemption of state law into a shield that provided the industry
with protection from liability when it denied needed medical �are �d ow
this has been narrowed by Pegram. In Part ill, we explore the 1mphcauons
of the Pegram rationale for why HM Os are not liable for breac h of ERISA

�

statutory fiduciary duties and how this triggers liability for state law
claims. HMO medicine has unique features-such as allowing medical
decisions to be made remote from a patient's bedside-that do not fit well
into state medical malpractice law and are better analyzed under common
law, as opposed to ERISA, fiduciary duty theory. Consequently,
application of state tort law may become quite com p lex . We conclude that
after Pegram, HMOs will be subjected to increased litigation under both
of these areas of state law.
The common thread in this analysis is that medical care decisionmaking
is ultimately made by individual physicians who are subject to claims
under state tort and fiduciary law. To the extent that these physicians are
controlled by an HMO or other man ag ed care organization, that entity will
be legally responsible for the physician's actions through vicarious liability
or through agency theory. 14 All managed care depends on controlling
physician be�avior, either directly or through physician medical directors,
thus r�gulation . of the behavior of these physicians will regulate the
managmg of patient care. We recognize, however, that this is only relevant
to plans that seek t o manage medical decisionmaking. Plans may escape
.
this regulation by limiting their role in the decisions about individual
patients and the quality of individual patient care, as did insur e rs before the
adve �t of managed care. To the extent that this disengagement frees
.
phys1c1ans to exercise their own conscience about medical care
de�i�ionmaking,
. it can improve patient care. To the extent that it results in
shiftmg the nsk of insurance to physicians without regard to their

denied cert'toran,·
.

.

·
me 1u d'mg

Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot life Ins. Co. . 663 So. 2d 905 (Ala) . arr.
denied, 516 U.S. 971 (1995) In �eems
, the Supreme Court let stand an Alabama Supreme Court

.
����!': � ?�

·

.
dec1s1o
n upholding a breach of fidu c1a d
ry uty action under ERISA based on t nJ u n es to the plamuff
an e pl
r's fai lure to pa� insurance premiums Further, the Alabama
Sup reme Court
.
breac 0
e ERISA fiduc i ary duty can support
punitive damages and held that state
courts may try such cases. See id.
.

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

14. While this Artic le is written 1·0 te
. .
rms o f Ph ys1c1ans.
the same theories apply to other health
care Protiessionals to the extent that state
law allows them to make impcndent medical decisions.
·

2001)

UABIUTY FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY Dllll'

s

competence and performance, it will hurt the quality of patient care. For
these reasons, we conclude that the most important consequence of
Pegram is the empowerment of state regulators.

II. HMO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY LoSES THE BRISA PREEMPTION

SHIELD
On Labor Day 1974, President Ford signed the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act [BRISA] to facilitate contracting for national
employers by eliminating the need to have to contemplate fifty different
state laws. To achieve such a goal, BRISA preempted all state law that
"related to" an employee health or welfare plan. 15 But within a decade of
ERISA's passage, double-digit medical expense inflation under the
prevailing fee-for-service [FFS] reimbursement system fushed health care
costs to prohibitive levels for American businesses. 1 Jn an attempt to
resolve such medical inflation, the nation embraced managed care-the
delivery of health care modulated b y utilization review and financial
incentives as the method to reduce medical costs. Stimulated by new
demand, the insurance industry produced a number of managed care
products of which the quintessential is the HMO. HMOs are the most
aggressive in applying utilization review and financial incentives to control
medical costs. Additionally, an HMO operating under BRISA had a
competitive advantage in the market place because ERISA's preemption
of state tort law served to shield the HMO from liability from medical
malpractice claims. Soon the majority of medical insurance products
offered by employers, as part of a benefit package; were HMOs organized
under ERIS A. 17
15. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 2000).
16. Before the 1970s, medical decisionmaking was driven by the Hippocratic ideal of
providing the patients with the smallest of benefits regardless of cost. Unfortunately, this maxim
becomes unrealistic in a world where supplies are l imited and medical costs are skyrocketing. Mark

Hall Institutional Control ofPhysician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment,
137 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 431, 435 (1988). In the seventies, the bills of the Great Society and the Vietnam
,

War became past due, thereby producing an inflationary pressure on the American e conomy. Medical

inflation was fwther aggravated by an Arab oil embargo. All costs rose; and medical costs in

particular. To help curb medical costs President Nixon signed the HMO Act in 1973 (42 U.S.C. 300e-

10). The following year President Ford signed ERISA which provided that qualified medical plans

would be immune from state malpractice laws, and thereby acquire an economic advantage over non

qualified p lans. See Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A

Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443

(1996).

17. Edward B. Hirshfield et al., Structuring Provider-Sponsored Organiwtions, 20 J. LEGAL

MED. 297, 300 (1999) (citing Levit et al., National Health Spending Trends in 1996, 17 HEALTH
AFF. 35, 36 ( 1 9 98 )) (Presently, BRISA organized HMOs account for 60% of the no n-Medicare
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ERISA's preemption of state law meant that any state tort law,

including medical malpractic e, that "related to" an ERISA plan was
preempted.18 Accordingly, in the early years of � anaged care �he �ourts
�
.
had to determine whether a denial of care dec1s1on was a utihzat1on of
benefits decision (hence "related to" the ERISA plan) or medical
malpractice (that was not "related to" the .P an). The first cou�s to ta� kle
. .
this problem viewed a denial-of-care dec1s10n to be a utihzation review
decision by the ERISA plan, and not a source for medical malpractice.19
This freedom from medical malpractice liability gained by an HMO under

�

ERISA provided a qualified employer benefit plan with a competitive
advantage in the market place becaus e the HMO would not have to
purchase insurance coverage.20 Because individual state tort law
.
interference with the operation of a national employer's plan was precisely
the evil that ERISA sought to prevent through the use of preemption, as
applied to health care, ERISA preemption was soon used as a shield to
protect the HMO from exposure to medical malpractice liability.

Thus, the perceived "positive" of cost efficient managed care was that
it would control medical inflation and therefore help to make national
employers more cost competitive in the new global market. However, the
downside of more "cost efficient" health care21 is that managed care is

insurance market.).
18. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (finding no
implied right to private action); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (deciding that
ERISA preempts New York human rights law).
19. The leading cases holding denial of utilization review are Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr.
810 (Ct. App. 1986) and Corcoran v. United Healthc are, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
20. Richards & McLean, sup r a note 16, at 451.
21. Whether managed care provides for more cost efficient health care delivery is debatabl e.
.
Ahce
A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, The Stages of M anaged Care Regulation: Developing Better
Rules, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &L. 1275 (1999) (discussing consumer backlash when managed
care products fail to control cost and provide what is conceived to be less than ideal care); William

M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Discl osure Laws and American Heal th Care, 99
C
· L. REV. 1 701, 1704 (1999) ("Not surprisingly, corporate intrusion into health care
dec1s1ons tu ed out to be as unpalatable as government intervention, prompting the current

Oi:-�

�

backl�h agamst managed care and renewing interest in preserving professional ideals through
regulation. Rather than asserting an alternative paradigm, this most recent upheaval is searching for

a way to manage managed care-to control cost and maintain access without leaving life-and-de ath
decisions to executives and accountants."); Charles Van Way, Death of Managed Care?,

METROPOLITAN MEDICAL SOCIETY OF GREATER KANSAS CITY BULLETIN, Mar. 2000 at
,
http: /www.metromed.org/ ("It is a central assumption of the Great Health Care Revolution that
medical care can be managed. So we have tried. We've tried
very hard. A lot of businessmen and

!

managers have become wealthy, but has it worked? Well, no. It's failed. In fact, it's failed in a
spectacular enough fashion to seriously annoy the voting public."); Thomas M. Burton. Examining
the Table: Operation that Rated Hospital Was a Success
but the Patient Died WAIL ST. J . Aug
. . .
23 1999 at Al . (If there was a true cns1s
m the delivery of heath care in America i.e. a true
'
demand for "qualit Y" health care, 1t would be provided,
perhaps at a higher cost, but in many cases

'

•

•

·

·

•

.

.
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perceived to distort the loyalty of the physician providers.22 Under fee-for
service reimbursement, the traditional theory was that the interests of the
doctor and patient were aligned; thus, more medical ca re was seen by both
the patient and the physician to be good medical care. 23 Patients
appreciated the extra attention, while the physicians received lavish
remuneration. In contrast, under managed care, the interests of the doctor
and patient are clearly disassociated. In fact, the doctors' and patients'
interests have become "triangulated" such that the third corner of the
triangle is occupied by an HM0.24 The addition of the HMO to the doctor
patient relationship inexorably produces a paradigm shift in the relation of
the doctor to the patient, which undermines the relationship of trust
between the d octor and the patient.25 Ultimately, whether a particular
patient is over or under treated rests upon the professional integrity of the
6
treating physician.2
Congress in 1974, which had only the year before passed measures to
aid the infant manage care industry,27 could not have imagined that the
enactment of BRISA could distort the fundamental unit of health care
delivery, that is, the doctor-patient relationship. But by the mid-1990's, the
implications of the Supreme Court's expansive view of "related to" as a
trigger for ERIS A preemption28 was recognized in multiple industries. 29

it could be done at the same or lower costs-if the plans had a long enough time horizon so that the
full costs of improvident short term cost saving strategies were incorporated in the plan costs.).
22. Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362
(7th Cir. 1998); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625

(8th Cir. 1997); Lancaster by Lancaster v. Kaiser

Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).

23. In practice, more care is not necessarily good care, since it might place the patient at
needless risk because the physicians might have a financial incentive to perform care that was
beyond their expertise. Also, even if arguably medically necessary, the care might be unwanted but
accepted anyway because many patients have trouble resisting the moral authority of their
physician. See Elliot S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of
Growth in Medical Care, 281JAMA 446-53 (1999).

24. Richards

& McLean, supra note 16, at 447-50 (providing a more detailed discussion of

the structure and functioning of managed care organizations).
25. Evidence that patient's need to have trust in their physicians may be observed in the

public's favorable response to US Healthcare's granting physicians more autonomy. Laura Landro,
Living With Change The Decision ls Yours: Doctors Are Starting to Embrace Information
Technology and Its Changing Their Relationship With Patients, WAU.ST.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at R 13.

26. Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2149 (2000) ("[l]n an HMO system, a physician's
financial interest lies in providing less care, not more. The check on this influence (like that on the
converse, fee-for-service incentive) is the professional obligation to provide covered services with
a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interest.").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-IO (2000).
28. See, e.g ., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.

134 (1985); Shaw v.

Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
29. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medic.

& Cl ini c al Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); see also
316 (1997); New

California Div. Labor Standards Enforcementv. Dillingham Const., Inc., 519 U.S.

[Vol. 53
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Once some aspect of state law was found to be "related to" an employee

benefits plan, that aspect of state law was nullified by ERISA's preemption
c lause. With respect to health care, preemption of state tort law meant that
a patient-beneficiary who sustained bodily injury due to a denial-of-care
administrative decision of an BRISA plan could be left "without a

remedy"30 because ERISA limited relief to equitable remedies-that is, non
p ecuniary relief.31 As c onstrued by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645

(1995).
30. E.g., Dockter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co 1993 US App. LEXIS 4385, at *5-6 (9th Cir. 1993)
.,

("[U]nder the law, however, ERISA preempts state law claims even if the plaintiff is left without

a remedy.") (citation omitted). See also Olson v. General Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1422-23

(9th Cir. 1991) (holding state law claims are preempted under ERISA and "[d]eclining to devise
a federal common law remedy even where plaintiff is left without a remedy'').

31. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Prior to Pegram, the
"Russell Doctrine" shaped the court' s view of compensating an ERISA beneficiary for harm due

to denial of care. Id. Russell alleged that she had been wrongfully denied medical coverage by her
insurer and consequently suffered financial embarrassment when such coverage had to be acquired

on the spot market. Id. at 136-37. The issue distinguishing Russell from Pegram is that the plaintiff
in Russell never sustained any physical injury; her injury was purely financial. A monetary award

for Russell's damages was held to be inconsistent with the "legislative intent and consistency with
the legislative scheme." Id. at 145. The Russell court followed the reasoning of

Cort v . Ash, 422

U.S. 66, 78 (1975) i n "determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly

providing one." Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37.
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying

purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a

cause of action based solely on federal law?
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). Specifically, "[t]he assumption of inadvertent omission [of
legal remedies] is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's interlocking,

interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in tum part of a 'comprehensive and
reticulated statute."' Russell, 473 U. S. at 146 (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). Russell considered the BRISA plan and the fiduciary to be a

single entity, adding "Congress did not provide, and did not intend the j udiciary to imply, a cause

of action for extra contractual damages caused by improper o r untimely processing of benefit
claims

."

Id. at 148. Moreover, ERISA "already provided specific relief for the sort of injury the

plaintiff had suffered (wrongful denial of benefits)." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 5 10

(19�6). For Russell, the proper remedy for wrongful denial of benefits was for the plai ntiff t o. file
a suit for recovery of the benefit. Russell, 473 U.S. at

144. Such a suit is based on 29 U.S.C. § 1133
(2000) ("Claims pr�edure: ln accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit
plan shall-( I) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for
benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written
in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and

(2) afford a reasonable opportunity
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Co. v. Russell,32 the combination of ERISA preemption of state tort law
and the limited options for granting relief under ERISA was translated to
mean that victims of wrongful denial-of-care decisions were left without
remedy for harm suffered by the administrative malfeasance of an BRISA
plan. 33 This anomalous situation was made worse because patients of non
ERISA qualified plans who were denied medical care were free to seek
compensation from their insurance plans. 34 More fundamentally, the states
were denied the power to address these problems through administrative
regulation of qualified plans because state regulation of benefits was also
preempted.
A. The "Related to" Problem Found in ERISA Preemption
As any curbstone philosopher can tell you, the problem with using
"related to" as a trigger for ERISA preemption is that everything is related
to everything else to one degree or another.35 Hence, any state law which
was remotely "related to" an employer's benefit plan, including laws
concerned with patient safety were preempted by ERISA. By the mid1990s, the expansive nature of "related to" was causing unanticipated
consequences in a number of industries. The tide changed with the
Supreme Court's 1995 opinion in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.36 After Blue Cross,
state laws that were of general applicability, laws which only indirectly

to any partici p ant whose claim for benefits has b�n denied for a full and fair review by the
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim."). Accordingly, the Russell co urt

declined to "tamper" with the st atutory remedies. Russell, 4 73 U.S. at 147. Because Russell's actual
damages were limited to pecuniary losses, the damages are analogous to those that Congress had
anticipated as occ�rring secondary to the administrative malfeasance of a pension fund. Given the

facts at hand in Russell, the Court appropri ately limited the plaintiffs remedies under ERISA.
However, the injury sustained by plaintiffs like Cynthia Herdrich represent an unprecedented form

of injury caused by breach of an ERISA fiduciary d uty . Pegram,10
2 S. Ct. at2143. Unfortunately,
the failure to distinguish financial damage from bodily injury damage after a patient is denied

medical care pervades legal analysis ofERISA medical administrative malfeasance cases prior to
Pegram.

32. 473 U.S. 134 ( 1 985).

33. 29 U.S . C. A. § 1132 note (citing Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49
( D. Mass. 1 997) ("ERISA's c ivi l enforcement provision .. . does not authorize recovery for
wrongful death, p erson al injury, or other consequential damages caused by improper refusal of
insurer or utili zatio n review pro vider to authorize t reatment .")) .

34. Fox v. Health Net. ofCal.,Cause No.219692 (Cal. Super.Ct.. Riverside City, 12123/93).
35. California Div.of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const. Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
336 (1997). "I think it would greatl y assist our function of clarifying the law if we simp l y
acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the 'relate to' clause of the pre
e m pti on provision is mea nt, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to id e ntify the field
in which ordinary field pre·emption applies." Id.

36. 5 1 4 U.S. 645 (1995).
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impact on the BRISA plans, would no longer be preempted � nde!
37
The key question left unanswered by the Blue Cross, Califomza Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, Inc. , 38 and

ER.I��·

DeBuono39 line of cases was precisely which laws are too tenuously related
to employee benefit plans so as not to trigger
preemption. After
Blue Cross the appellate courts struggled with where to draw the line
between "related to" and too tenuously related with respect to HMO
administrative malfeasance in health care delivery.
One of the first cases after Blue Cross to address this issue was the
La.ncaster by l.Ancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan40 case, which
involved the medical care given to an eleven-year-old child with
headaches.41 Beginning in 1991, the child was taken to her primary care
physician [PCP], an em loyee of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, which
operated under BRISA. 2 While treated under the Kaiser HMO for five
years, no diagnostic tests were perfonned and the patient was never
referred to a neurologist for evaluation. 43 The child was treated
symptomatically with adult strength narcotics until 1996, when the child's
school performance began deteriorating.44 The child's school psychologist
urged a neurologic evaluation, which revealed that forty percent of the
child's brain had been replaced by a tumor.45

ERISA

f:

K aiser is an interesting example of the use of branding in HMOs. While
most commentators know of the Kaiser model in California, with its large
physician panels and access to a broad variety of hospitals, in other states
Kaiser is often organized very differently, with very small panels of
physicians, limited specialty coverage, and inadequate access to hospitals
and clinical facilities. Thus, a Kaiser plan in Virginia, where this case took
place, may be very different from the California model, which accurately
reflects the public's perception of Kaiser. This leads to a potentially
troubling consumer expectations. This is critical to Lancaster because the
issue became one of denying her proper testing and referral to a specialist.
Moreover, these plans have two corporate entities. The insurance plan is
set up as a non-p �ofit corporation and Kaiser emphasizes this in its public
relations campaigns. The physicians work for a separate for-profit
.
corporation,
become stockholders, and thus share in the profits. The two

37.See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med.
..
D11lmgham Const., 519 U.S. at 316.
38. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
39. 520 U.S.
806 (1997).

40. 958
41. Id.

F.

Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).

42. Id. at 1139.

43. Id. at 1139-40.
44. Id. at 1140.

45. Id.

& Clinical

Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997);
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corporations are tightly intertwined, with the plan buying care from the
physician corporation. The physician corporation, in turn, pays the
physicians incentives "whereby physicians receive bonuses for avoiding
excessive treatment and tests."46 The key factors driving these incentive
schemes, which are used in most HMOs and are the focus of a lot of
litigation, are the costs of sending patients outside the plan, running tests,
and admitting and treating patients in the hospital, especially in hospitals
that are not controlled by the plan. Care rendered by in-plan physicians
does not increase costs, theref ore in-plan referrals are generally not
penalized, while out-of-plan referrals are. Thus, the defendant physician
in Lancaster would see his bonus reduced if he sent the patient to a
specialist outside the plan or if he ordered diagnostic tests. In the
California style Kaiser plan, this is not a critical issue because the plan has
adequate access to specialists and testing facilities. However, in a location
with few physicians and facilities, the same incentive scheme has become
very dangerous.
Negligent care was clearly rendered to the Lancaster child, and formed
the basis for a classical medical malpractice claim. Additionally, the
plaintiff argued that the same facts established a breach of fiduciary duty
by the physician and the plan. This allegation was based o n the negligent
establishment of an "[I]ncentive Program and for intentionally and
knowingly concealing its existence from the plaintiffs."47 Kaiser
"characterized this claim as attacking an administrative decision of the
plan, not a medical decision,"48 which the Lancaster court accepted.The

Lancaster court then looked for precedent in a line of cases involving
utilization review , which concluded tha t administrative decisions involving
benefits are preempted under ERISA.49 Since such fraud claims are based
on state law, "[p]ermitting these claims to proceed would undermine the
congressional policies that underlie ERISA. Absent preemption, for
instance, benefit plans would be subject to conflicting directives from one
state to the next .. "50 The La.ncaster court then limited the plaintiffs
.

.

recovery to classic medical malpractice against the physician and vicarious
liability against the plan, a decision based upon Kaiser's characterization
of physicians as plan employees through its corporate branding of the
physician group. The Lancaster court rejected the breach of fiduciary duty
based on the incentive scheme and suggested that "there is no remedy

46. Id.
47. Id. at 1146.

48. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 457.

49. Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1144 (citing Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88F.3d1482

(7th Cir. 1996)).

50. Id. at 1150.
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the
against an BRISA plan using an improper incentive plan or even hiding
51
incentive plan from its patients."
Lancaster is illustrative of a body of case law that had developed m the
previous ten to fifteen years. The courts took the �iew that ERISA's
preemption of state law allows for the BRISA q uahfied health plan to
engage in administrative malfeasance either by arbitrary denial o care� or
by the creation of disingenuous physician incentives, without tnggenng
state law liability for any bodily injury caused to a patient-beneficiary.
Hence, while the physician in Lancaster could be sued in state court for the
failure to make a proper referral, the fact that the physician's conduct was
•

�

directly caused by HMO enticement was neither a defense to the physician
nor the basis for a cause of action against the HMO. Moreover, the
La.ncaster court allowed the plaintiff a cause of action against Kaiser
which was predicated on vicarious liability for holding out the physicians
as "Kaiser" physicians. Thus the Lancaster court d istinguished direct plan
liability and vicarious liability for medical malpractice. In contrast to direct

liability, which the Lancaster court considered to be barred under ERISA
preemption, BRISA was not a barrier to an action for vicarious liability.
B. Using Fiduciary Law to Solve the "Related to" Problem
In addition to state tort law, fiduciary law is used to modulate the

professional behavior of physicians, thereby indirectly influencing HMO
behavior. Thus, independent of the medical malpractice approach of
Lancaster, the issue of whether breach of fiduciary duty was " relate d to"
ERISA plans arose as the plaintiffs lawyer tried to collaterally attack
HMO administrative malfeasance. Shea v. Esensten52 and Neade v.
Portes53 analyzed the degree to which fiduciary law was related to an
employee benefit plan. While separated by nearly two years, Shea and
Neade have very similar facts and the legal theory in Neade was clearly

?ased on the hol�ing in Shea. Patrick Shea was a forty-year-old executive

the co!11puter industry who had a history o f heart disease in his family,
but was .m good health personally.54 While on a business trip he suffered
c est pai.ns, and, upon his return, he sought out his family physician for a
d1 �gno sti c worku�.s As described in the plaintiff's complaint, Mr. Shea's
primary care phys1c1an (PCP) reassured him that he h ad nothing to worry
about, as he was too young to have a heart attack.56 His pains persisted, as

m

?

�

5 I . Richards & McLean , supra note 16, at 458.
v.

52. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997), appeal
after remand, Shea
F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000).
53. 710 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
54. Shea, I07 F.3d at 626.

Esensten, 208

55. Id.

56. Id.
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did the reassurances.57 After several months of trusting, and after being
dissuaded by his physician that it was necessary for Mr. Sh ea to spend his
own money to see a cardiologist, Mr. Shea died of "heart failure. "58 Upon
investigation, what was on its face a simple case of grossly negligent
medical care became a complex BRISA case of breached fiduciary
obligations.59 The appeals court held that under ERISA, Mr. Shea' s widow
did have a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty since the physician' s
incentive program, in essence, bribed the physician-fiduciary not to
provide medical care.60 Interestingly, the Shea court never explicitly stated
just who was the fiduciary;61 whether it was a particular physician or a non
medical administrator of the BRISA plan. The Shea court remanded the
case without specific instructions on the nature of the remedy.62

57. Id.
58. Id. Since this case arose from a dismissal, the court only explored the plaintiffs facts. It

is possible that they did not paint an accurate picture of the care provided by defendant and that a
di fferent picture will emerge as facts are developed with further discovery.

59. Id.
Unknown to Mr. Shea, Medica' s contracts with its preferred doctors created
financial incentives that were designed to minimize referrals. Specifically, the
primary care doctors were rewarded for not making covered referrals to specialists,
and were docked a portion of their fees if they made too many. According to Mr.
Shea's widow Dianne, if her husband had known his doctor earned a bonus for
treating less, he would have disregarded his doctor's advice,

sought a

cardiologist's opinion at his own expense, and would still be alive today.

Id.
60. Id. at 629.
[W]e believe Mrs. Shea has stated a claim against Medica for breaching the
fiduciary obligation to disclose all the material facts affecting her husband's health
care interests. When an HMO's financial incentives discourage a treating doctor
from providing essential health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan

benefit structure, the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a
breach of ERISA's fiduciary duties.

Id.; see also Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., WL 405055 at •5 (E.D.Pa. , Jun 30, 1 998) (discussing
Shea).
6 1 . Shea, 107 F.3 d at 625. The fact that the Shea court did not define the fiduciary is key to
understanding Pegram. The citations used to support the Shea opinion suggest that fiduciary
common law was contemplated. This w..i11ld have been appropriate under ERISA because ERISA
incorporates fiduciary common law. In contrast, the Pegram court considered only statutory
fiduciary duty as established by ERISA.
62.

Although Shea was unprecedented as a breach fiduciary duty cause ofaction arising under

ERISA, Shea implicitly contemplates damages for bodily injury arising from medical administrative
malfeasance, and recognized that an incentive program that corrupts the judgment of a fiduciary is

far from unheard of under BRISA. See also Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624, 634 (D.

Minn. 1988) (holding defendant liable for breach of fiduciary duty where incentive program
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Similar to the facts in Shea, Anthony Neade was approximately thirty
seven-years-old in 1990 when he began to show the classic symptoms of
coronary artery disease, including chest pain radiating into his arm and
shortness of breath.63 Neade had a family history of heart disease, w as

overweight, suffered from hypertension, smoked, and had a high

cholesterol count.64 While in the hospital, Neade underwent various tests,
including a thallium stress test, which was interpreted as normal.65

Following his discharge from the hospital, Neade continued to experience

chest pain, and like Mr. Shea, was assured that his chest pain was not
cardiac in origin. On one such occasion a doctor taking call for Mr.
Neade' s PCP evaluated Mr. Neade, and recommended the "gold standard"
for the evaluation of coronary artery disease: coronary angiography.

However, Mr. Neade' s PCP, without any re-evaluation, terminated further
diagnostic testing.66 Ultimately, Mr. Neade suffered a massive myocardial
67
infarction caused by coronary artery blockage, and died nine days later.
The care rendered to Mr. Neade was sub-optimal, since he should have
received further medical evaluation.68 In its review of the case, the Neade

court recognized that an action for breach of fiduciary duty could arise
from the same set of facts that support a cause of action for medical
malpractice.69

Two factors emerge as common threads in Lancaster, Shea and Neade.
First, the alleged medical malpractice was not a single mistake, based on
information from a single patient encounter, but a systematic failure to re

evaluate the initial diagnostic decision in the face of symptoms and
complaints by the patient that were incompatible with the diagnosis.
Second, re-evaluation of the patient would have required spending plan
resources for hospitalization, additional testing, and/or out-of-panel

resulted in excessive trading in security); Anweiler v. American Blee. Power Serv. Corp. , 3 F.3d
986, 991 -92 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant breached fi duciary duty by failing to provide
complete material information concerning the methods of reimbursement); Ries v. Humana Health
Plan , I nc No. 94 C 61 80, 1 995 Lexis 1 6592 at •to (N.D. Il l., N v. 8, 1 995) (citing 29 U.S.C.A.
o
§ I 04(a)( l
("fidu iary' s covert profiteering at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its
�
.
duties of acting solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries '" ).
.•

�

)(A)�
.

63. Neade v. Portes, 7 1 0 N.E.2d 418, 421 (Ill. App. Ct.
1 999).

64. Id.
65. Id.

Th�lium

studies have a false positive rate o f approximately 20% for detectin g
coronary artery disease when compared with coronary angiogr
aphy. Id.
66. Id. Even after the
requested a consultatiw� examination by a
physician, the
PCP elected not to Proceed wtth coronary angiography
choosing instead to rely on the reported
results of the thallium scan. Id.

PC�

67. Id.

part-time

Se�, e.g Macdonald v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1 430 (M.D. Ga. 1 994) (finding that
a s11ru lar patient history should have alerted the physician
to the patient's high risk of a h e art
attack).

. �8.

69.

. •

.

Neade, 1 1 0 N.E.2d at 426.
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expertise which would have thereby increased the cost to the plan and
decreased the physician's reimbursement. Under FFS, which tends to err
on the side of too much/unnecessary care, it is very likely that the patient
would have received the hospitalization, testing, and specialist referral .
While the PCP might be equally incompetent in both scenarios, the
involvement of other professionals and the additional test information
would make the patient's condition much harder to ignore.
In contrast, several factors distinguish Lancaster from Shea and Neade.
The most important distinction is the consideration given to the degree of
fiduciary duty owed by the physician to the patient under BRISA. The
word "fiduciary" does not even appear in the court' s analysis of Lancaster.
In contrast, the court' s analysis in Shea is heavily focused upon the
fiduciary duty owed by physicians, especially the obligation for physicians
to conduct themselves with good faith and undivided loyalty to their
patients.
Second, Lancaster viewed denial of care decisions as being a utilization
and review decision and thus not a medical decision. From the Lancaster
court's vantagepoint, managed care health plans provide two independent
functions; "namely that of health care insurer and that of medical services
provider "70 The Lancaster court concluded that health plans only make
administrative decisions and not medical decisions because such decisions
"cannot be stretched to imply that [a defendant] went beyond the
administration of benefits and undertook to provide [the decedent] with
medical advice."71 For the Lancaster court it was only natural that denial
.

of medical care decisions should fall under the heading of utilization and
review because:
The absurd consequences of concluding otherwise confirm
the correctness of this conclusion. BRISA plans are required
to provide a participant or beneficiary written notice of a
denial of benefits and an opportunity for a full and fair review
of that denial by an appropriate plan fiduciary . . . The
.
ERISA p articipant or beneficiary denied benefits under ht � or
her plan can then seek judicial review of that specific
administrative denial . . . . Thus, if every instance of negligent
treatment by a physician were construed as an administrative
denial of a claim for plan benefits, then in every such case the
patient would have the right to notice and review with !espect
to that medical treatment decision, followed by a heanng and
judicial review with respect to each "denial" of a plan benefit.
.

70. IAncaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1 144.
7 1 . Id. at 1 148 n.33 (quoting Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat' I Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
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BRISA neither contemplates nor requires such an absurd
result.72
In short, under

Lancaster, utilization and review decisions, including
denial of care decisions, are to be analyzed separately and independently

from medical decisions.

To the Shea court, a "denial of care" decision is a medical decision,
rather than an allocation of resources issue. 73 Interestingly, the Shea court
cited the same case cited by the Lancaster court when it recognized the

case at hand as a medical decision rather than a utilization and review
decision.74 Because physicians in a managed care environment made

medical decisions, the physician had a "fiduciary obligation to disclose all
the material facts" to the patient.75 In implying that physicians are

fiduciaries under ERISA, the Shea court took notice that some injuries
have irrevocable consequences. 76 A utilization and review decision, when

made in the context of the administration of a pension plan, can be litigated
for years without fear that a party will suffer physical injury. But, as the

tragedies of the Shea, Neade, and Herdrich well illustrate, time is critical

in medical decision cases and delay in treatment can have irreversible
consequences.

The final factor which distinguishes Lancaster from Shea and Neade
was the degree to which the court believed the plaintiff had an adequate
remedy. The Lancaster court concluded that the plaintiff' s medical

malpractice posed "no ERISA questions because BRISA does not apply to
medical care decisions made by treating physicians."77 Moreover, the

Lancaster court explained that the plaintiff' s vicarious liability claim

72. Id.

�3.

Shea v. Esen sten , 1 07 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1 997); see, e.g . . Murphy v. Bd. of Med.
Exa� rs, 49 P. 2d 530 (A�z. Ct. App. 1 997). Dr. Murphy, an Arizona licensed physician, was the
medical director for a national HMO and in that role authorized pre-certifications for medical
treatment. See Murphy, 949 P.2d at 532. When pre-certification was denied, a patient would have
to pay out-of-pocket for the denied treatment. See id. However,
when the Arizona Board of Medical
_
_
·
Exanuners issued Dr. Murphy an advisory
· g "an mapprop n ate medical
l
f
etter
o
concern
reg
ardin
. .
.
dec on which could have caused harm to a patient,"
he objected. Id. at 534. He claimed that he
c
rned
ou . not be censured by the licensing authority
since he was not engaged in the practice of
_
ld at 535 The Arizona Supre� c
icme.
ourt disagreed , finding that when the administrative
.
.
work of a
luded
tor
i sions that affected the care of individual patients , the
.
medical director is m
ng m
�cal decisions, and therefore can be subject to the jurisdiction of an
administrative oversigh t comnuttee. /d.
at 535-3 6
74. See Shea, I 07 F 3d at 627 (
ct't'mg K �hi v. Lm�o ln Nat'! Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 30 1 .
04 (8th Cir. 1 993)) ("we h
h Id hat l ms o f
sconduct against the admini strator of an
��
ernployer' s health pl an fall
fo ab Y wtthm
ERISA s broad preemption provisio n") .
75. Id. at 629.
76. Id.

�

·

;�

·

medical d'::::

��

=� � �

77

·

·

·

·

:

·

·

.

�

Rich ards & McLean supra
note 1 6 • at 456, (citing Lancaster, 958 F Supp.
.
at 1 1 43).
•
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against the plan based on ostensible agency was not preempted by BRISA,
therefore, the plaintiff was left with a clear remedy against the plan. 78
Lancaster envisioned that the plaintiff would receive some compensation
on a tort theory from the state court upon remand.79 In contrast, the Shea
court observed that "the district court correctly decided that ERISA
preempts Mrs. Shea's state-law claims."80 Thus, the Shea court must have
contemplated that its award for breach of fiduciary duty was to be the sole
form of relief available to Mr. Shea' s widow.
C. Applying ERISA Statutory Fiduciary Law to Solve the "Related to "
Problem
Cynthia Herdrich filed suit against her physician and Carle Clinic for
breach of fiduciary duty, arising from medical care provided by an ERISA
qualified plan. 81 Defendant Carle Clinic "operate[d] a pre-paid health
insurance plan which provide[d] medical and hospital services"82 and
employed Ms. Herdrich' s physician, Dr. Pegram. Examination of Ms.
Herdrich by Dr. Pegram identified a six by eight centimeter abdominal
mass, which was inflamed.83 Dr. Pegram allegedly "delayed instituting an
immediate treatment of Herdrich," per the policies of the plan.84 To make
matters worse,
[d]uring this unnecessary waiting period, Herdrich' s health
problems were exacerbated and the situation rapidly turned
into an "emergency"-her appendix ruptured, resulting in the
onset of peritonitis. In an effort to defray the increased costs
associated with the surgery required to drain and cleanse
Herdrich' s ruptured appendix, Carle insisted that she have the
procedure performed at its own Urbana facility, neeessitating
that Herdrich travel more than fifty miles from her
neighborhood hospital.85
As such, the delay "subjected [Ms. Herdrich] to a life threatening illness,
a longer period of hospitalization and treatment, more extensive, invasive
and dangerous surgery, increased hospitalization costs, and a greater
ingestion of prescription drugs."86 Similar to the plaintiffs in Lancaster,

78. LAncaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1 1 49; see also id. at 1 148 n.32.
79. Id. at 1 1 50.
80. Shea, 1 07 F.3d at 627.
8 1 . Herdrich v. Pegram, 1 54 F.3d 362, 364-65 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd 1 20 S. Ct. 2 1 43 (2000) .
82. Id. at 365.
83. Id. at 374.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 378.
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Shea and Neade, Herdrich's complaint alleged "the intricacies of the

defendants ' incentive structure . . . [provided for] an incentive . . . for
8
[physicians] to limit treatment. " 7 Moreover, such incentives meant that
[a] doctor who is responsible for the real-life financial
demands of providing for his or her family sending four
children to school (whether it be college, high school or
primary school), maldng house payments, covering office
overhead, and paying malpractice insurance might very well
"flinch" at the prospect of obtaining a relatively substantial
bonus for himself or herself. 88
In analyzing Herdrich, the appellate court noticed that "the defendants

had the exclusive right to decide all disputed and non-routine claims and
8
thus were in fact, ERIS A fiduciaries. " 9 In fact, Dr. Pegram owed fiduciary
duties not only to Ms. Herdrich due to the nature of the doctor-patient
relationship, but also to her employer, Carle Clinic, and to the ERISA plan
itself. Dr. Pegram' s multiple fiduciary duties were not mutually exclusive
and frequently led to conflicts of interest, as the doctor attempted to serve
multiple masters. The Herdrich court concluded that the incentive plan
could reasonably have corrupted the fiduciary duty owed by the physicians
and the plan to the p atient beneficiary. 90 The appellate court then remanded
the case for a determination of damages along guidelines outlined by the
court.91 The Herdrich court directed that a determination of damages for
breach of BRISA fiduciary duty was to be indexed according to the
unnecessary medical expenses incurred by the plan.92 Requiring that
damages be structured in such a manner was clearly within a literal reading
of the determinations of damages to an ERIS A pension plan. 93
Shea, Neade, and the appellate decision in Herdrich all attempt to
resolve a major anomaly in the law: when a health plan's administrative
malfeasance results in bodily injury to a beneficiary, the traditional

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 33 1 .
Id.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1 1 32; see also Harsch

v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 65 1 . 660 (7th Cir. 1 992)
not availabl e under ERISA). ERISA allows a
cipant or beneficiary·
to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to en rce
�
fo
his nghts under the terms of his plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the te ms o
r
f
the plan." Id. at 654 Pursuant to
.
nati onal po1·icy, Congress wished
to protect the pension plans from
n xpected and excessive financial
liability. Accord ingly, Congress prescri bed that damages were
o e clearly definable and henc
e predictable.

�Extr��ontractual compensatory damages are
�

:�

·

·

·
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remedies available to such a beneficiary are markedly different if the plan

is an BRISA qualified plan.
In all of the above cases, the HMO administering an ERISA health plan

used financial incentives to modify their physicians '

judgment. Such

financial arrangements are frequently kept secret from patient-beneficiaries
by the use of a "gag rule" clause in the physician provider's contract.94
Whether such business practices are used alone or in tandem as part of a
system with other behavior modifiers, their purpose is the same-to
establish dual loyalties in physicians. The problem with dual loyalties in
physicians is, of course, that the need to serve multiple masters
perniciously corrupts the physician' s decisionmaking process.

D. Pegram's Narrowing of ERISA Preemption
Against this confusing and contradictory back drop of appellate cases,95
the Supreme Court accepted Pegram for review. There are two keys to
understanding Justice Souter's opinion. The most important i s the Court' s
narrow view of what constitutes an employee health plan under ERISA.96
This excludes the HMO from ERISA preemption because the provision of

medical care is not the ERISA plan. Second, after Pegram, an action
against a p hysici an or HMO for breach of statutory fiduciary duty , as in
Herdrich, is no longer available to plaintiffs, but the court did not limit the
application of fiduciary common law actions against either of these two
categories of defendants. Consequently, the Court has left the door open

for fiduciary common law actions and remedies to be used as a method to

remedy wrongful HMO denial of care decisions.

The Pegram court noticed that " ' ERISA's definition of

an

employee

welfare benefit plan is ultimately circular: any plan, fund, or program . . .
to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established . . . for the

94. A typical gag clause prohibits a contracting physician from making disclosures that could
undermine the trust the patient has in the physician and/or insurer. As the physician generally has
as much to gain as the HMO by keeping incentive plans secret, it is mere speculation that the simple
prohibition of such clauses in a physician contract will induce the physician to have a more open
discussion with patients about financial incentives. However, because employers provide the
m ajority of commercial insurance, ERISA preemption has in the past nullified the anti-gag rule
statutes. In light of the recent holding in Pegram, gag rules may now be enforceable across the
board.

95. Confusion exists in these cases as to which law was applicable. Shea and Neade
contemplated that the physician involved had breached fiduciary common law duties, while
Herdrich contemplated that the physicians involved had breached ERISA statutory fiduciary
obligations to their patient beneficiaries. The contradiction of these opinions is best illustrated by
observing the differing remedies which were contemplated by the Lancaster and Shea courts.
96. Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2 143, 2 1 5 1 (2000) . ERIS A covers employee benefits and
pension plans. While ERISA comprehensively regulates pension plans, it provides only minimal
details on the management of these benefit/health plans.
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. through the purchase of insurance or

.

purpose of providing .

otherwise . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits. "'97 To the
Pegram court, the word p lan referred "to a scheme decided upon in
advance."98 In the delivery of health care, this means that the ERISA plan
"

"

is limited to "a set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and
provide for their enforcement. Rules governing collection of premiums,
definition

of

benefits,

submission

of claims,

and

resolution

of

disagreements over entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that
constitute a plan. "99 In other words, as it interfaces with the delivery health
care, the ERISA plan is limited to the contractual relationship between the
employer and employee that outlines the employees' benefits and not the
100
The structure of an HMO
contractual rules by which the HMO operates.
is not an BRISA plan, nor is the operation of an HMO necessarily part of
the HMO plan. To the extent that operation of the HMO is directly dictated
by the plan, such operations would be part of the plan. This situation could
only arise where a self-insuring employer was operating the HMO
101
themselves.
Because the HMO itself is removed from the employer
employee benefit contract, the HMO ' s contractual relationships that
motivate its physician providers are even more removed from the plan. The
remoteness of the HMO-provider contractual relationship served as the
foundation for the Pegram court to c onclude that physician i ncentives are
102
too tenuously connected to the ERISA plan to be "related to" the pl an .
However, to the extent that an HMO is acting as a fiduciary agent of the
plan, the HMO might still owe the plan and its beneficiaries certain duties
under ERISA. A fiduciary u nder BRISA is defined as anyone who wields
authority or discretionary responsibility in the
"discretionary
" 103
administration of [an ERISA] plan.
The use of the word "discretionary"
was to bring all persons involved in making administrative decisions for
BRISA plans into a common regulatory scheme. When Congress enacted
ERISA, it "intended that this statutory definition of ' fiduciary' be broadly
interpreted."104 This meant that one could become an BRISA fiduciary
97.

98.

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002{1 )(A)).

Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1 879 (2d ed.

1 957)); see also
Pet�r D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts : Achieving
Fairness and Equity in ER/SA Jurisprudence, 35 HOUSTON
L. REV. 985, I 050 ( 1 99 8 ) .
99. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 2 1 5 1 (citing Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F. 2d 97 1 , 974
(5th Cir. 1991 )).

1 00. Id. "[11he provisions of documents that set up the HMO are not, as such, an ERISA plan,
but the agree�ent betwee� an HMO and an employe
r who pays the premiums may . . . . " Id.

�

1 0 . Th1s would be m accordance with ERISA'
s "deemer" clause, 29 U.S.C.A.
.
which 1s beyond the scope of this Articl
e.

1 02. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 2 1 55-56.
1 03. Id. at 1 5 1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1 002(2 1 )(A)(
iii)).
04 .

�
�erdnch

�

§

J

1 44[c],

v. Pegram, 1 54 F. d 362, 370
(7th Cir. 1 998), rev 'd 1 20 S. Ct. 2 1 43 (2000)
(citi g Chamnan of the House Comnuttee
on Education and Labor, 1 20 CONG. REC. 3977, 3983

�
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without having a fonnal contractual relationship with the beneficiary. 105
The statutory definition of a fiduciary under ERIS A reflects the realization
by Congress that it would need the business expertise of the employers to
design BRISA-qualified plans. With respect to pension funds for
employees, the employer had an obvious conflict of interest. By defining
the ERIS A fiduciary on the basis of discretionary authority, Congress
recognized that the contractual relationship between the employer and
employee would be inadequate to safeguard funds in a pension plan, hence

the plans would have to be policed statutorily. Historically, the common
law had policed contracts by finding that a power party owed fiduciary

obligations to the other party.106 Congress' statutory modification of
fiduciary common law was simply an attempt to tailor this ancient body of
law to a creature of the twentieth centu ry.107 But in so doing, Congress had
accepted that its statutory fiduciaries would, out of necessity, have divided

loyalties.
In making a medical decision, a health care provider' s judgment is
guided by personal experience and accumulated medical knowledge. Given
that discretionary means "a power or right conferred upon them by law of
acting officially in certain circumstances, according to their own judgment
and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others," 108
it is clear that in making a . medical decision the physician uses
discretionary judgment. Thus according to BRISA, whenever a health care
provider exercises discretionary judgment to provide a medical service,
that provider would become an ERIS A fiduciary.109 Importantly, since the

(Feb. 25, 1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, at 3 29 3 ).

1 05. Id. ("[A) party's fiduciary status hinges not on whether it is named in the plan agreement,
but rather on whether it satisfies the statutory definition of a fiduciary in section l 002(2 1 )(A) of
ERISA.").

1 06. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary law., 7 1 CAL. L. REV . 795, 801 ( 1 98 3) (citing HENRY MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 1 69-70 ( l st ed. 1 861 )).

107. Id. The need to modify the fiduciary common law was driven ultimately by two factors.
.
First, the common law recognized few relationships to be fiduciary. These limited rel ationshi ps
would not have covered all the
parties that would have access to the pension funds that Congress
sought to protect . Id. at 805. Second, divided loyalties were anathema to fiduciary common law.
Id. at 81 1 . But as noted
above, the employers who were to be "conscripted" into managing the plans
would have divided loyalti
es.
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONAR
Y 466 (6th ed. 1 990) .
. . 1 �. The Shea court
never explicitly declared the treating physicians to be fiduciaries, but it

is implted. Health care decisi on
s involve matters of life and death , and an ERISA fiduciary has a
duty to speak out if he or she "knows that silence might be harmful." Shea v. Esenster, 1 07 F. 3d

625 , 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (citi ng
Bixler v. Cent. Penn. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 1 2 F.3d

! 292 , 1300 (3d Cir .

1 9 93)) ;

see

also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 73 (1 959). Also,

[t]his kind of patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about treatment
options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by self-
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mere exercise of discretionary judgment over the benefits of an BRISA
0
fiduciary, 1 1 all m di al

��

plan makes an individual a statutory ERI

� �

�

service providers to ERISA patie�t-ben�ficianes are ERISA duc1 �1es
_
regardless of their contractual relat1onsh1p to the medical
plan itself.
In
short, because of ERISA ' s broad definition of a fiduciary 1 12 every
physician involved in the delivery of medical services could be � ERISA
,

fiduciary whose decisions could be subject to breach of fiduciary duty
actions. The potential for the federal courts to become clogged by breach
of fiduciary duty actions under ERIS A that were predicated on a denial of
care decision was an unspoken policy motive for the Pegram court to
conclude that physicians and other health care providers, including HM Os,
are not ERISA fiduciaries. 1 1 3
ERISA also incorporates fiduciary conunon law. Thus, "[r] ather than
explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other

fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to de fine the
general scope of their authority and responsibility. " 1 14 At common law "[a)
fiduciary relationship exists when the parties are under a duty to act for or
give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the

serving financial considerations created by the health insurance provider. The
district court believed Seagate 's employees already realized their doctors'
pocketbooks

would be adversely affected by making referrals to outside

specialists. Even if the district court is right, Seagate 's employees still would not
have known their doctors were penalized for making too many referrals and could
earn a bonus by skimping on specialized care.
Shea, 1 07 F.3d at 628-29.
1 1 0. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6 U.S. 489, 498 ( 1 996) "[A] 'person is a fiduciary with respect
to a plan' and therefore subject to BRISA fiduciary duties, 'to the ei1tent' that h e or she ' ei1ercises

discretionary authority or discretionary responsibi lity in the administration· of the plan." Id. (citin g
BR I SA, 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 02 ( 1 997)); see also 29 U.S.C.S. § I 1 02 ( 1 997); Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d
1 1 56, 1 1 62 (4th Cir. 1 996) ("Concept of fiduciary under ERISA is broader than common law

concept of trustee; it includes not only those named as fiduciaries in plan instru ment, or who,
pursuant to procedure specified in plan, are identified as fiduciaries, but any indi vidual who de

facto performs specified discretionary functions with respect to management, assets, or
adminis�ration of plan."); advisory notes accompanying 29 U . S . C. S . § 1 1 06 ( 1 997) (citing Reich
'!· Hosking, 20 E.B.C. I 090 (E.D. Mich. 1996)) ("Individual can be held liable as ERISA fiduciary
if he or she exercises discretionary authority, or possesses discretionary authority.").
1 1 1 . Herdrich v. Pegram, 1 54 F.3d 362, 371 (7th Cir. 1 998), rev 'd 1 20 S . Ct. 1 43 (2000).
2

I 1 2. Id. at 370 (citing 1 20 CONG. REC. 3977, 3983 ( 1
974), reprinted in, 2 LEGISLATIVE

�!STORY OF THE :8MPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1 974 , at 3293 ( 1 974))
� Congress, when it enacted BRISA, intended that this statutory definition of
'fiduciary' be broadly
interpreted.").

1 1 3. Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2 1 43, 2 1 58 (2000) ("But we have seen
enough to know

·
that ERISA was not enacted out f
o concern that phys1c1ans
were too poor to be sued or in order
·
.

�

to ti
.

m

erahze �alpractice litigatio n in the name of
fiduciary duty for any other reason ") .
Vanry, 5 1 6 U.S. at 496 (quoting
H R . REP. No. 93-533 ' at 3-5 1 1 - 1 3 ( 1 97 3 ) rep ri'nted
·
2 LEGISlATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOY
EE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1 974.
14

'.

.

'

'
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relationship."m Patients have limited contractual rights,

116

while the
physicians who arbitrate the patient' s medical care exercise power in a

non-reciprocal manner. 1 17 Consequently, it is to be expected that physicians
are fiduciaries. In fact, the physician-patient relationship has long been
deemed one with a fiduciary character. 1 1 8 "The inherent necessity for trust
and confidence requires scrupulous good faith on the part of the
physician."1 19 Moreover, "[a] physician occupies a position of trust and
confidence as regards his patient-a fiduciary position ." 120 The Missouri
Supreme Court opined that "the confidential bond between a doctor and
patient is a fiduciary relationship."121 In our society "a physician occupies
a position of trust and confidence as regards his patient-a fiduciary
position . . . . This duty of the physician flows from the relationship with
his patient and is fixed by law-not by the contract of employment."1 22
Currently, most jurisdictions have found physicians to be fiduciaries. 123
The most significant difference between ERISA's statutory definition
of a fiduciary and the way in which the common law views a fiduciary is
the degree to which a fiduciary may have divided loyalty. ERISA
124
contemplated that the statutory fiduciary might have divided loyalties.

1 1 5. Associated Indenmity Corp. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 9 1 8 S. W.2d 580, 596 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996) (citing Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 993)).
1 1 6. Frequently, as demonstrated in Shea, an employer contracts with an insurer to provide
for medical coverage. Consequently, the employee is presented a health benefit plan where the

specifics of coverage have already been determined. Alternatively, i f the patient purchases medical
insurance directly from an insurer, the patient receives what in essence is an adhesion contract.
1 17. While the doctor or insurer may be solicitous of the patient-beneficiary's wishes, hopes

and desires, the decision to render medical care at present is entirely within the preview of the

physician and insurer.

1 1 8. Saulenas v. Penn, 192 N.E. 42, 43 (Mass. 1 934); see also Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93

N.E.2d 612, 6 1 4 (Mass. 1950); Garcia v. Coffman , 946 P.2d 2 1 6, 222 (N.M. 1 997) (referencing
Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From Their Physicians, 55

U.Pm. L.REV. 29 1 , 349 ( 1 994)) ("Several treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient
relationship as a fiduciary one and the courts have tended to concur.").
1 1 9. Hun ter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1 1 62, 1 1 66 ( 1 971 ) (citing Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589
(Wash. 1967).
1 20. Brandt v. Med. Def. Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. App. 1 992); see also Moore v.
Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 96 1 ) (stating the exact proposition).

1 2 1 . Brandt, 856 S.W.2d at 670 (citing State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 393
(Mo. 1989)); see also State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 1 27, 1 28 (Mo. 1 978) (finding that

the physici an s undivided loyalty is to his patient).
'

122. Moore, 345 S.W.2d at 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 96 1 ) (citing Parkell v. Fitzporter, 256 S.W.
239 (Mo. 1 923)).
123. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 2 1 6, 2 2 2 (N.M. 1 997) (referencing M ary Anne Bobinski,

Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From Their Physicians, 55 U.Prrr . L. REV. 29 1 , 349

( 1 994)) ("Several treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary
one and the courts have tended to concur."); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479 , 479 (Cat. 1990).

1 24. ERISA' s allowance for divided loyalties was predicated upon the realization that to have
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The extent of scrutiny

an

ERIS A fiduciary is to receive during a review of

the fiduciary' s conduct was to be determined by the degree to which the
fiduciary's decision was made in the absence of divided loyalty. When a
fiduciary decision was made in the presence of undivided loyalty to the
plan, Congress determined the fiduciary should be reviewed under the
prudent person standard. 125 In essence, ERIS A's prudent person standard
for breach of fi duciary duty is simply a restatement of the standard of
1 6
review for a common law breach of fiduciary duty. 2 However, when an

BRISA "fiduciary has dual loyalties, his independent investigation into the
basis for an investment decision which presents a potential conflict of
interests must be both intensive and scrupulous and must be discharged
with the greatest degree of care that could be expected under all the
circumstances by reasonable beneficiaries and participants o f the plan."1 27
The greatest degree of care possible means that "even a good faith belief,
held by the trustees does not insulate them from charges that they have
acted imprudently."128 Conversely, a fortuitous discretionary decision by
an ERISA fiduciary that yields a solution in the best interest of the plan is
not a substitute for a detailed investigation of the highest possible care by
the BRISA fiduciary.129 "Employers,

for example, can

be ERISA

fiduciaries and still take actions to the disadvantage of employee
beneficiaries, when they act as employers (e.g., firing a beneficiary for
reasons unrelated to the ERISA plan), or even as plan sponsors (e.g.,
modifying the terms of a plan as allowed by BRISA to provide less
generous benefits)."130

In contrast to ERISA' s pragmatic view, at common law, dual loyalties

are an anathema to the exercise of fiduciary duty. "Professor Scott's
treatise admonishes that the trustee 'is not permitted to place himself in a
position where i t would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the
b�ne ciaries.
"P�ohibition of d u al loyalties in its purest form
elurunates conflict of mterest, and hence [is] one protective mechanism

?

"'1�1

sufficient business expertise to administrate the complicated employee pension plans, the services
of the beneficiaries' employers would have to be enlisted. 29 U.S.C.
§ l l 08(c)(3) (2000) .
1 25. 29
§ 1 1 04(a)(l )(A) ( 1 999) ("{f]iduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to

�.s.c._

a pl� sole!� 1� the mterest of the participants and beneficiari
es and (A) for the exclusive purpose
of: (t) prov1dmg �nefits to participants and their beneficiari
es; and (ii) defraying reasonable
.
expenses of admtmstering the plan").
1 26. This is consistent with ERISA's incorporation of the Common Law of Trusts. See 29
U . S .C. § 1 1 04 note (2000) .

�;�: ��

novan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D.N
.Y. 1 98 1 ).

1 29.

Id. at 47 1 .

l 30. Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2
1 43 2 1 5 2
1 3 1 . Id. (Citing AUSTIN w. Scon

(2000) .
& WlllJAM F. PRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSTS
'

.

(1987)).

·

311,

§ 1 70
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against abuse of fiduciary power. "132 As such, BRISA' s allowance for dual
loyalties in its fiduciaries therefore threatens "one of the Act' s declared

purposes to protect employees' interests in benefit plans."133
Pegram recognized that financial incentives, which by_ their nature have
the potential to divide the loyalty of physicians, would lead to problematic

legal analysis because of this dichotomy in the way in which BRISA
statutorily allowed for dual loyalty and the common laws abhorrence of the
same. 134 The Court pointed out that in

every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, then, the

threshold question is not whether the actions of some person
providing services under the plan adversely affected a plan
beneficiary' s interest, but whether that person was actin as
a fiduciary when taking the action subject to complaint. 1 5

§:

Realizing that the instant case under review had multiple fiduciaries (the
HMO and its physician agents are BRISA statutory fiduciaries to the extent
that they make discretionary decisions over medical services, and
physicians are independently ERISA fiduciaries due to BRISA
incorporation of the common law of trusts) to answer this question, the
Court had to first parse out to which fiduciary the complaint was
addressed.
The Court concluded that the complaint did not address the medical

decisionmaking by the treating physicians. "Herdrich does not point to a
particular act by any Carle physician owner as a breach."136 Moreover, "at
oral argument her counsel confirmed that the BRISA count could have
been brought, and would have been no different, if Herdrich had never had
a sick day in her life."137 Rather, the complaint was directed solely at the
HMO for breach of "its duty to act solely in the interest of beneficiaries by
making decisions affecting medical treatment"138 while simultaneously
maximizing their own profits by inducing the physicians providers to make
medical "choices to minimize the medical services . provided."139
Thereafter, Justice Souter' s discussion only contemplates the HMO's
liability under ERISA for breach of statutory fiduciary duty. The court's
silence on physician s common law obligations to their patients leaves
'

132. Frankel, supra note 106, at 8 1 1 .
133. Schoenholtzv. Doniger, 657F. Supp. 899, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing 29U.S.C. § lOOl(b)

(1982)).
1 34. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 21 50.

1 35. Id. at 2146.

1 36. Id. at 2 1 53 .
1 3 7. Id.
1 38. Id.
1 39. Id.
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open the possibility that fiduciary common law could be used

as

mechanism to regulate both physicians and HMOs.140
In regards to the HMO ' s liability for breach of fiduciary duty under
BRISA, a two-pr ong analysis is required: first, was the HMO ' s i�centive
plan part of the BRISA plan (thereby triggering BRISA preemption) and
second, was sufficient discretionary authority wielded by the HMO to
make it a fiduciary under BRISA? The Court answered the first prong
unequivocally, "No." "The HMO is not the BRISA plan." 141 Under
Pegram, HMOs are merely contractors who implement the employer' s
benefits plan Then, because the HMO was not an BRISA plan, the
administration of the plan was not related to the plan itself and cannot
trigger BRISA preemption of state tort or fiduciary law.
To determine whether fiduciary obligations to the patient-beneficiary
were breached requires a more d etailed analysis, because there are
potentially multiple fiduciaries (due to exercise of discretionary authorit)
over plan assets): the employer, the HMO, and the physicians who actual I)
14
provide the plan benefits. 2 First, the Court contemplated whether the
employer, as a fiduciary, breached its duty to the plan by contracting witt
the particular HMO. Pegram again concluded that the answer was "no.'·
An "employer' s decisions about the content of a plan are not themselve�
fiduciary acts." 143 Similarly, the incorporators of the HMO did not violate
the employer's BRISA plan by setting u p a financial incentive to control
144
their physici an ' s behavior.
In other words, what the Court i s saying i�
that neither the structure of the employer' s benefit plan nor t h e structure
or internal operations of the HMO, acting alone or in concert w ith eacf.
other, can result in breach of statutory fiduciary under ERISA.
Next, Pegram addressed the potential for breach of fiduciar y duty b)
•

the HMO. The court divided the HMO 's responsibilities i n regards to
patient care into "eligibility decisions," "treatment decisions" and "mixed

140. See infra Parts Ill & IV (discussing this potential).
141 . Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2 1 53.
142. In analyzing BRISA fiduciary duty, the Court clearly contemplated the
actions of the

HM

?

. The actions of the physicians are mentioned only collateral ly, because
the p hysicians in this
particular case were owners ofthe HMO. However, the statutory
fiduciary rules applied by the court
.
to the HMO should be applicable to all non-owner physicia
ns practicing in the HMO environment.
because under ERISA, both the HMO and the physicians are
conceptually fiduciaries due to their
delegated discretionary auth rity to m � decision s regardin
g plan assets. See id. A "physician
_
employee would also be subject to hab1hty
as a fiduciary on the same basic analysi s that would
charge the HMO." Id. at 2 1 58. The physician would
be a statutory fiduciary to the extent that the
HMO is a statutory fiduciary.

?

3;1<

1 43. Id: at 2 1 53 (citing Lockheed Corp. v. Spink
, 5 1 7 U.S. 882, 887 ( 1 996) ("Nothing in
ERISA requires employers to establish emplo
yee benefit plans. Nor does ERIS A mandate
what kind
of benefit employers must provide if they
choose to have such a plan.")).
1 44. Id. at 2 1 48.
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eligibility treatment decisions."145 Pure eligibility decisions are those
decisions which concern the particular condition or medical procedure for
a treatment covered by the plan. 146 Pure eligibility decisions are clearly
covered by BRISA because they are related to the plan. In contrast,
"treatment decisions" are "choices about how to go about diagnosing and
treating a patent' s condition: given a patient' s constellation of symptoms,
what is the appropriate medical response."147 What the court termed
treatment decisions are in reality medical decisions, which clearly would
not trigger ERISA protection because they are too tenuously related to the

plan.

In contrast, mixed eligibility treatment decisions are those decisions
predicated on
physicians' conclusions about when to use diagnostic tests;
about seeking consultations and making referrals to
physicians and facilities other than Carie's; about proper
standards of care, the experimental character of a proposed
course of treatment, the reasonableness of a certain treatment,
8
and the emergency character of a medical condition. 14
In essence, mixed eligibility treatment decisions are a hybrid of the
eligibility and treatment decisions. In the business of health care delivery
such decisions are termed ''denial of care" decisions. Virtually all
�ecisionmaking in delivering health care in a HMO environment-whether
tt be a medical director' s decision that a condition is not covered, or a
decision of a treating physician not to treat or refer a medical condition,
would be classified as mixed eligibility treatment decisions by the Pegram
Court. To determine if mixed decisions are related to the ERIS A plan, the
Court needed to locate mixed decisions on the spectrum of eligibility
treatment decisions. Notice was taken that "the common law trustee' s most
defining concern historically has been the payment of money in the i�terest
of the beneficiary."149 Further, "when Congress took up the subject of
fiduciary responsibility under BRISA, it concentrated on fiduci�ies'
financial decisions, focusing on pension plans, the difficulty many retire.es
faced in getting the payments they expected, and the financial
mismana ement that had too often deprived employees of their
ft
benefits." so Accordingly, the Pegram Court opined, "Congress did not

I 45. Although the Pegram Court used different language than the appellate courts, the concept

is the same: in ERISA health care cases one must distingui sh the utilization review decisions, which

are related to the plan, from the medical decisions, which are not related to th e ERISA plan.

146.
147.
1 48.
149.
150.

Id. at 2 1 54.
Id.
Id. at 2155.
Id.
Id. at 2 1 56 (citing s. REP. No. 93- 1 27 ' at 5 ( 1 973); S. REP. No. 93-383, at 1 7 (1973)) .
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intend Carle or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent
that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its p��sicians."151
However, the far-reaching implications o the egram dec1s1011: c � �est
.
be eluc idated by looking at the converse situation. If nuxed
ehg1b1hty
treatment HMO administrative decisions are not covered under ERISA,
then which HMO administrative decisions are covered? B ased on the
Court's discussion only pure eligibility decisions are related to the plan
and hence cove
under BRISA. Importantly, because pure eligibility
decisions are the only HMO administrative decision covered by ERISA,
such decisions are the only ones that are entitled to E�IS A p�e�mpt on
protection. After Pegram, if an HMO engages m adnumstrat1ve
malfeasance, the BRISA preemption shield will only be availabl� for those
pure eligibility decisions. When a patient is harmed by a demal of care
decision, because such decisions are no longer covered by ERISA, the
HMO will not be able to remove the case to federal court based on a
question of federal law. In essence, while it is true that BRISA preemption
protection is available to the HMO for pure eligibility decisions, Pegram
has so narrowed the BRISA's preemption in the delivery of health care as
to make it an inconsequential form of protection.152
Pegram thus ratifies the current majority view of the appellate courts
that BRISA' s preemption shield is not available for administrative
malfeasance in the delivery of health care. 153 DeLucia v. St. Lukes 's
Hospital154 found that ERISA did not prevent a state court from deciding
the liability of a insurer for allegedl?" providing suboptimal health care.
Crum v. Health Alliance-Midwest15 held that because the is sue under
review was the quality of health care, rather than erroneous denial of
benefits, BRISA preemption was not triggered. The different roles of an

�

�

red

�

1 5 1 . Id. at 2 1 5 5 .
1 52. The courts may reach a different conclusion fo r a self-insured plan where the employer

controls the HMO. Under such a fact pattern, the u ltimate discretionary authority for a denial-of
care decision would lie with the employer and not with the plan. Because a business organization

cannot practice medicine, the employer' s decision wou Id lack a "treatment" component. Hence, the
employer's decision would be more of a pure eligibility decision (or alternatively a decision
which
wrongfully denied benefits). Herdrich v. Pegram, 1 54 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1 988)
(citing Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 6 1 3 (7th
Cir. 1 995)). In
.
Hams
Campbell So�p C�. bought out a corporation, terminated some of
the purchased
corporation s employee medical insurance coverage and installed Provident
Insurance as the Third
Party lns� rer to watch over the plan's interests. In a subsequent suit
for breach of fiduci ary duty,
after fin ing that Camp ll was a� ERIS fiduciary, the court "emphasi
zed that it was Campbell,
not Provide�t, who re med
nght to direct and control the claims procedures and practices
, as
well as the nght to decide all disputed and non-rout ine claims." Id.
1 53. The minority opinion is exemplified by Pryzbow
ski v. US Healthcare Inc 64 F Su
2d 3 6 1 , 369 (D.N.J. 1999), a case alleging injury due
to the failure of the trea ing hysi ian
adv ate f�r �ut-�f-network surgery . The Pryzbowski
court characterized this as a challen ge to the
plan s ad1n1rustranon and not the delivery of health care.
1 54. No. Civ. A. 98-6446, 1999 WL 38721
1 , •4 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1999) .
1 55. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 1 3 (CD Ill. 1 999).

�rus_t.
�

�

�
� th�

�

�

� � ���
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HMO in health care delivery were distinguished in Baumen v. US
Healthcare, Inc. 156 While tal<lng notice that the HMO was an BRISA
administrator, Baumen found that quality (or alleged lack thereof) of health
care provided by an HMO was a matter that was not preempted by ERISA.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Pappas v. Asbel151 that state
negligence l aws had "only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection" to

and hence were not within the scope of BRISA
preemption. 158 In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Doe, 159 the Missouri district
court found that a variety of tort claims, including intentional infliction of
mental distress, were not preempted by BRISA. In fact, in the wake of
Pegram, there is evidence that the appellate courts are even more skeptical
of ERISA preemption:

ERISA plans

Although state efforts to regulate an entity in its capacity as
plan administrator are preempted, managed care providers
operate in a traditional sphere of state regulation when they
wear their hats as medical care providers. BRISA preempts
malpractice suits against doctors making coverage decisions
in the administration of a plan, but it does not insulate
physicians from accountability to their state licensing agency
or a8sociation charged to enforce professional standards
regarding medical decisions. S uch accountability is necessary
to ensure that plans operate within the broad compass of
sound medicine. We are not persuaded that Congress intended
for BRISA to supplant this state regulation of the quality of
medical practice. While it may impose some indirect costs on
ERISA plans, the Court has considered such effects too
tenuous to require preemption. 160

Pegram is unwilling to allow plaintiffs to sue for these mixed decisions
under BRISA, and hence extend the BRISA preemption shield to

administrative malfeasance in denial of care decisions, because the court
believes that this just duplicates remedies already available in state courts:
�hat would be the value to the plan participant of having this
kind of BRISA fiduciary action? It would simply apply the
la� already available in state courts and federal diversity
actions today, and the formulaic addition of an allegation of

1 56. 1 93 F.3d 1 5 1 , 1 62-63 (3rd. Ck. 1999).
1 57. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated U.S. Healthcare Sys. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 1 20 S .
Ct. 268 6, 2686 (2000) ( Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, Eastern District, for further consideration in light (of Pegram] . . . . ) .
1 58. Id. at 892.
"

"

·

1 59. 46 F.

Supp. 2d

925 (E.D. Mo. 1999).

1 60 . Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir. Tex.

2000) (citations omitted).
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financial incenti ve would do nothing but bring the same claim
into a federal court under federal-question jurisdiction. It is
true that in States that do not allow malpractice actions
against HMOs the fiduciary claim would offer a plaintiff a
further defendant to be sued for direct liability, and in some
cases the HMO might have a deeper pocket than the
physician. But we have seen enough to know that ERIS A was
not enacted out of concern that physicians were too poor to be
sued' or in order to federalize malpractice litigation in the
161
name of fiduciary duty for any other reason.
The most interesting comment is the reference to "[s]tates that do not
allow malpractice actions against HMOs."162 If allowing the plaintiff to sue
under BRISA for these decisions only duplicates state law in states that do
not bar litigation against HMOs, then the Court is saying that there i s no
ERIS A bar to these claims in state court, under state law, including state
fiduciary law. Thus, this decision calls into question whether there is any
BRISA protection left for HMOs and their physicians, especially their
administrative physicians and medical directors, except for the pure
eligibility decisions, which are almost never at issue in plaintiff
malpractice actions. Furthennore, the Court' s discussion of breach of
fiduciary duty concerned only breach of fiduciary duty under BRISA, not
state common law. Nothing in ERIS A would prevent a physician fro m
being sued in state court for breach of fiduciary duty.163 The problem for
the HMO industry is that once the physician i s found liable for either
medical malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty under state law, the HM0
can be found vicariously liable for the physician' s conduct if it employed
the physicians or represents to the public that the physicians are the
HMO's agent. 164
Pegram thus appears to be a Pyrrhic victory for the HMO industry. In
finding that mixed decisions of treatment and eligibility, the essence of a
denial of care decisions, are not related to the ERISA plans, the shield of
BRISA preemption is no longer available to HMOs that are involved in
medical care decisionmaking. This emphasizes the key finding of the case:
that the ERISA plan is the employer' s designation of preferred benefits,
not the medical administrative structure used to deliver the proffered
benefits. This decision has no affect on the employer's benefits decisions .
H MOs that choose t o manage medical decisionmaking, directly o r through

1 6 1 . Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2143, 2 1 58 (2000) .
1 62. Id.
1 63. See, e.g., Maxxam v. Hurwitz, 1 992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5274, 1 0
(N.D. Cal. 1 992)
(preempting only claims within scope of 502(a)). But cf Weems
v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. , 663
So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1995) (denying state law claims based on preemption).
1 64. Petrovich, v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 719 N.E.2d
756, 775 (Ill. 1999).
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branded medical groups, will have to deal with fifty different state laws
concerning medical malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. 165 This will
increase administration costs for these HMOs due to the need to absorb the
increased liability. 166 As HMO administration costs rise, the ERIS A HMOs
will loose their competitive advantage over non-ERISA HM Os. 167 In short,
we cannot understand why the stock market reacted favorably to the
ERISA HMO stock after the announcement of Pegram.
Pegram took notice that the judicial system was not the best form for
the analysis of HMO decisionmaking. Such decisions concern the rationing
of medical care, which is difficult at best. 168 The Court realized that while
the rationing might have been done poorly in the case under review, 169 it
was fundamental to managed care.170 Thus, the Court concluded that since
the legislature had endorsed such rationing, it was not for the courts to
decide which form of rationing better suited the legislature' s public policy
goals.171 The Court was well aware of Congress' active involvement in
HMO regulation. 172 Moreover, for the Court to impose statutory fiduciary

165. Brent D. Hitson, Alabama 's Lonely Battle: An Attempt to Exert State Juristiion and
Award Punitive Damages for Excusively Federal ER/SA Claims in Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Life
Insurance Co, Inc., 26 CUMB. L. REV. 591 , 63 1 ( 1 996).
1 66. ERISA authorizes the purchase o f insurance.
167. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 452.

168. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 21 50.
Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme, and
rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others (ruptured appendixes
are more likely; unnecessary appendectomies are less so}, any legal principle
purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would embody, in effect,
a judgment about socially acceptable medical risks.
Id.

169. Id. (citing Kevin Grumbach, et al. Primary Care Physicians ' Experience of Financial
Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 5 1 6 (1998) ("arguing that HMOs

that reward quality of care and patient satisfaction would be preferable to HM Os that reward only
physician productivity")).
170. Id.

1 7 1 . Id. "But such complicated factfinding and such a debatable social judgment are not wisely
required of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative process, with its
preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social value, such as optimum
treatment levels and health care expenditure." Id. "Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary

to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic
as that presented here."' Id. (quoting Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 3 05
331 n. 12 ( 1 995)) .
1 72. Id. at 2 1 56-57 ("The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1 9 73, 87 Stat. 9 1 4 42
,
U.S .C. § 3 00e et seq. , allowed the formation of HMOs that assume financial risks for the provision
ofhealth care services, and Congress has amended the Act several times , most recently in 1 996 . See
,

1 10 Stat. 1976, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e ( 1 994 ed. Supp. III). If Congress wishes to restrict its
approval of HMO practice to certain preferred forms, it may choose to do so.").
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duty on the HMO in the present case would � c?�nt to public policy, 173
because it would increase HMO exposure to h ab1hty. 4 Thus the Supreme
Court signaled that it no longer wanted to retrospectively review medical
decisions based on BRISA statutory fiduciary guidelines. Howe ver, courts
of law will always be the proper forums to hear actions based on fiduciary
common law.

m. REGULATION OF HMOs UNDER STATE FIDUCIARY COMMON LAw
Pegram destroyed the protection from state law that HMOs received
under BRISA for administrative malfeasance in medical decisionmaking.
"[W]e held that, in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state
regulation, there is no BRISA preemp tion without clear m ani fes tati on of
congressional purpose."175 Pegram had no desire to federalize medical
malpractice. 176 Hence, Pegram clearly contemplated that state medical
malpractice law would be used to regulate HMO health care delivery.
However, the practice of medicine in an HMO environment i s u n l i ke the
practice of medicine in the fee-for-service [FFS] environment that honed
and polished the tort of medical malpractice. Financial incentives under
FFS directed physicians to provide too many medical services and errors
in health care delivery were assumed to be anomalous situations. Under
FFS, the frauds that occurred involved the taxpayer and the i n s urer . 177 In

contrast, financial incentives in HMO health care delivery direct the
physician to under-treat patients . 1 78 Fraud which equates to wro n gfu l denial

of care for pecuniary gain, results in a fraud that "is more likely to make

1 73. The Balanced Budget Act of 1 997 specifically authorized the use of HMO structure for
the delivery of health care under Medicare. Pub. L. No. 1 05. 33 § 407 (a).
1 74. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 2 1 57.
It wo�ld be so easy to allege and to find , an economic influence when sparing
:
care did not lead to a well patient, that any such standard in practice would allow
a factfinder to conv�rt an HM � into a guarantor of recovery . . . [f]or all practical
pu
��ses, every cl:Um of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician maki ng a mixed
dec1s10 would bod down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would
�
be n t�mg but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against
�
phys1c1ans.
Id.

1 75. Id. at 2 1 58 (citing N.Y. St. Conf. ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins . Co .,
5 1 4 U.S. 645, 654-55 ( 1 995)).
1 76. Id.

177 J hn T. Bo se, When Angry Patients become Angry
Prosecutors: Medical Necessity
�
: �
Determinations, Quality of Care and the Qui
Tam Law, 43 ST. LoUJs u. L.J. 5
3 , 5 8 ( 1 999)
.
1 78. Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at 449 .
·

UABIUTY FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

2001)

33

the patient the primary victim. "179 HMO health care delivery has fueled the
media battle over the incidence of errors in the delivery of health care. 180

HMO health care delivery creates unique mechanisms by which

patients are harmed. The concept of injuring a patient by limiting the care
options to the patient did not arise under FFS health care delivery, so the
traditional tort mechanism for redressing medical injuries has not yet
evolved to deal with the new mechanisms of injury ushered in by HMO
health care delivery. True, given enough time, medical malpractice law
could be modified to cope with denial of care issues. But, stretching a body
of law predicated upon misguided or misapplied acts is not necessarily the
best application of modem jurisprudence. This is especially true where
there already exists a well-formed body of fiduciary common law that is
ideally suited to deal with medical errors arising from conflicts of
interest. 181 While breach of statutory fiduciary action under BRISA may no
longer be used to redress patient harm, nothing in Pegram prohibits an
action against a physician for breach of common law fiduciary duty.
182
While most jurisdictions have found physicians to be fiduciaries,
none has appreciated that a physician may simultaneously be a fiduciary
in more than one capacity. A physician' s fiduciary duty applies whether the
physician acts in the capacity of a treating physician or as an administrator
(medical director), or both. Both types of physicians have intrinsic
conflicts of interests, which could serve as the foundations for a breach of
fiduciary duty action. Both types of physicians are omnipresent in HMO
health care delivery. But the loyalties and obligation associated with the
fiduciary relationships of the treating physicians and the medical directors
are not identical. Despite wearing the cap of a corporate administrator, the
medical director is nonetheless engaged in the practice of medicine
whenever the medical director' s decisions are based on information about,
and affect the care of, a specifically identified patient. 183 Because the

179. Boese, supra note 1 77 , at 58.
1 80. See, e.g To ERR Is HUMAN: BUilDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn
..

et al eds., 1 999) (The well-publicized "IOM report" concludes that as many as 98,000 Americans
.

die each year due to errors which occur in the health care delivery system.); Clement J. McDonald
et al., Deaths Due to Medical E"ors Are Exaggerated in the Institute of Medicine Report, 284

JAMA 93-94 (2000 ) (disputing the validity of the methodology employed by the IOM). But see
Lucian L.

Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA

95-97 (2000) (rebuttal to McDonald).

1 8 1 . Medical malpractice arises when a physician negligently provides an independent medical

judgment. But the clinical material that underpins such a judgment must be gained from being at
the patient' s bedside. Thus, the majority of such medical malpractice cases are ultimately incidental

to a physical examination being performed. Hence, the physici an or the physician• s agent must at

some point be at the patient' s bedside. In contrast, breach of fiduciary law, the subornation of the
patient' s interest to the physician's interest, can occur anywhere.

1 82. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1 990).
183

·

This mirrors the distinction the United States Supreme Court drew between decisions that
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er medical
medical director does not routinely examine patients-rath
lt to
directors only examine a patient 's medical record-it can be difficu
184 However, such
hold a medical director liable for medical malpractice.
fiduciary
medical administrative malfeasance can be easily handled under
common law.
A.

Medical Practice and the Obligations of the Treating Physician

Ordinarily, the delivery of medical care is by a treating physician who
will provide patient care either in a direct or indirect fashion. Direct patient
care is care provided by a treating physician in a "face to face" fashion.
Gynecologists, internists. surgeons and the like provide direct, hands-on
patient care. In contrast, indirect patient care occurs when a treating
physician acts in a consultant capacity. In this regard radiologists,
pathologists, and anesthesiologists (collectively the "hospital-based
physicians") all provide medical expertise required for specialized medical
decisionmaking. Although p atients rarely know the names of the hospital
based physicians who participate in their care, patients are generally aware
of the existence ofhospital-based physicians, and that these physicians also
provide care through specialized medical care services. After reviewing the
raw data1 85 obtained from the patient, the hospital-based physicians
memorialize their medical decision in consultative reports found within the
body of the patient' s medical record, and in bills for services , just as the
direct patient care providers do. Because the consultant physicians have
rendered a medical judgment that affects the care of the patient, they have
been subjected to traditional malpractice liability for their negligent
16
decisionmaking. 8
Treating physicians are the archetypal "doctors" who enter into what
. 1 87
the l aw terms the "doctor-patient" or "physician-patient" relationship
Traditionally, treating physicians have been proud of their individual
autonomy, and have seen themselves as being the patient's advocate. The

involve individuals and those that involve populations. See Londoner v. City & County of Denver,

2 1 0 U.S. 373 (1908); see also B i-Metallic lnv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 44445 ( 1 9 1 5).
1 84. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6 U.S. 489, 514 (1 996).
•

1 85. Raw data as used herein contemplates the actual examination of a radiographic or
pathologic examination.

1 86. See, e.g., Jen?ff v. Gleason, 52 A.2d 1323, 1 329 (1987) (holding that indirect providers

�

have a duty to communicate unusual findings, as the communication is as important as the findings

�

�

�
�th mf�nnatton

adsen ' 7 9 S.W.2'.1 866, 874 (Tex. 1 987) (holding that indirect providers
.
necessary for informed consent); Hiers v. Lemley,
have a duty to prov1d� patient
o. App. Lexis I 500, 5 (finding pathologists are the ultimate arbitrators of a clinical
1

themselves); Grana o v.

?91 �

d1agnos1s).
1. 87

·

�0.r all the physicians (direct and indirect patient

care providers), the doctor-patient

relat1 0nsh1p 1s created when the doctor renders an independent medical judgment (i.e., a decision).
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doctor's superior knowledge, as compared to the patient, leads naturally to
paternal ideation, while the financial incentives under the FPS
reimbursement system encouraged the physician to do everything possible
for the patient. When a treating physician exercises such non-reciprocal
power by rendering a medical judgment that affects a patient' s health care,
188
the physician becomes a fiduciary to the patient.
The medical decision itself is the end result of a reiterative five-step

intellectual process. The steps are:
( 1 ) evaluation of patient' s complaints and history,
(2) gathering physical and laboratory information,

(3) making a medical decision,
(4) re-evaluation of the outcomes of those decisions, and
(5) the collection of new information about the patient's
altered condition.

A treating physician gathers information by taking a history from a
patient, the p atient's family, or speaking with a fellow health care provider
(Step 1). Alternatively, infonnation can be extracted from the patient's
medical record. This oral and written information is supplemented through
the "laying of hands" on a patient (that is, physical examination) and
through obtaining confirmatory laboratory studies (Step 2). Medical
decisionmaking results from the physician's mental thought process as the
first two steps are reviewed under the aegis of the phys ic ian ' s training and
experience (Step 3). Such decisions are two-fold, encompassing a
diagnosis and a treatment recommendation. While diagnosis is often seen
as the key operational decision by physicians , from the patient' s

perspective, the treatment recommendation, or lack of one, i s more
critical. 1 89 It is the remaking of these medical decisions that is the practice
of medicine. Step 4, the evaluation of the outcome of the medical
intervention, is the most critical because it closes the loop. If the outcome
of treatment is not effective (that is, the patient does not improve), the
medical decision must be re-evaluated. If the treatment is effective, the
patient must be monitored to assure that the condition stays controlled. 190

1 8 8. Frankel, supra note 106, at 800.
1 89. Society clearly views the making of a medical decision to be the dominant step in the

practice of medicine. Gathering and affirming of medical information has for sometime been an
activity which could be delegated to a physician assistant or a nurse. The privilege of making a

medical decision, however, remains an activity reserved to physicians in most states.

1 90. When a medical decision is totally i n appropri ate due to the failure to properly complete
the first two steps (gathering and affirming of medical information) the result is gross negligence.

In contrast, "garden variety" medical malpractice results from fai lure to adequately reassess the
impact of a medical decision and correct those decisions which yield an aberrant and adverse
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Step 5 begins the process again. Outcome evaluation !11ay be based on
follow-up lab tests, patient reports, and subs�quent physical exams. These
.
last two steps are most likely to be compronused m managed car� , because
they require the evaluation of what should be a ..well" patient.
In
Herdrich, Shea, Lancaster, andNeade, a subseque�t checkup o f th� pat� ent
would have shown that the initial diagnosis was incorrect, allowmg time
for proper diagnosis and treatment.
.
As a fiduciary, the common law imposes all of the general fiduciary

19�

obligations upon the treating physician, which include:
.

192

( 1 ) The requirement to disclose maten' al mfiormat1on.
9
(2) The use of good faith and fair dealings with patients. 1 3
(3) Maintenance of confidentiality. 194
1 95
_
(4) Formal notice for the termination of the relationsh ip,
.

•

•

and

outcome.

is that after the first three
the pati ent i s presumed
"well." Managed care operates on the assumption that the initial medical deci sion was presumably
1 9 1 . A major premise in the cost cutting rational of managed care

steps in the practice of medicine, subsequent review i s unnecessary

as

a correct decision. If it is incorrect. it is often the patient who must convince the physician,
sometimes in the face

of fatal opposition, as in Shea and Lancaster.

192. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1 997); see also Garcia

P.2d 2 16, 222 (N.M.

v.

Coffman, 946

Ct. App. 1 997) (citing Kem ex rel. Kem v. St. Joseph H os p . , Inc 697 P.2d
.•

135, 1 39 (N.M. 1 985) ("physician's affinnati ve duty to disclose material infonnation continues
beyond tennination of the fiduciary relationship )); Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1 162, 1 166 (Wash.
"

1 97 1 ) ("Whether the failure to disclose was willful or attributable to negligence is
immaterial."); Hunter 484 P.2d al 1 167 (citing Michael J. Myers, Comment, Informed ConsenJ in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REV. 13 96, 1407 (1967)) ("[a] physician is under an obl igati on to
(1) make a full disclosure of all known material risks in a proposed operation or course of treatment
except for those risks of which the patient is likely to know or (2) to prove the reasonableness of any
lesser disclosure or the immateriality of the undisclosed risk.").
193. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6 U.S. 489, 506 ( 1 996) (citation omitted); see also Hunter, 484

Ct. App.

P.2d at 1 1 66 ("At the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else
and this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choos e between two
alternative courses of action."); Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. 1 96 1 ) ('The physician

the utmost good faith.").
194. Brandt v. Medical Defense Assoc., 857 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. App 1 992) (holding that the
fiduciary duty or confidential relationship between physician and patie
nt implicates a duty to
disclose all material information concerning the patient's treatment) ; see also Garcia, 946 P.2d at
222 (citing Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hosp. , 698 P.2d 4 3 5 , 439 (N.M . Ct. App.
1 984)) ( [F]iduciary
duty or confidential relationship between physici an and patient implicate
s a duty to disclose all
material information concerning the patient's treatment."); Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1 990): Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 1 1
3 , 1 1 3 (M ass. ), cert denied, 474 U.S.
546 (1985); Home v. Patten, 287 So. 2d 824, 828 ( 1 973);
H ammonds v . Aetna Cas. & Sur., 237
F. Supp 96 (N.D. Oh. 1 965).

has a duty to act with

"

1 95 . Hammonds, 237 F. Supp at 99.
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(5) Undivided loyalty.196
Breach of any of the general fiduciary duties by a physician was
actionable at common law. The two most important of the general
fiduciary duties for the physician are a duty of "loyalty" and "good faith
and fair dealing." Shea observed that the "duty of loyalty requires [a
physician] fiduciary to communicate any material facts which could
adversely affect a plan member's interests." 197 Additionally, good faith and
fair dealing imply that the physician-fiduciary may face a civil action for
what is known customarily as "dishonesty." Hence, conduct which could
potentially trigger liability for breach of fiduciary duty includes: "bait and
switch" (a nominal physician 's services are actually provided by another�
e.g., during surgical residency), 198 where a physician receives a profit in
any form for the referral of a atient for an otherwise needed service
(specifically, laboratory work), 1 and other forms of self-referral with built
in "kickback" mechanisms.200
Importantly, at common law, the standard for review in determining
whether a breach has occurred is from the patient's perspective. "When an
ailing person selects a physician to treat him, he does so with the full
expectation that such [a] physician will do his best to restore him to
health . . . . "201 Along these lines the Shea Court observed:

J

Although the district court acknowledged Medica' s duty of
loyalty, the court felt the compensation arrangements between
Medica and its doctors were not material facts requiring
disclosure. We disagree. From the patient's point of view, a

1 96. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 469 ( 1 98 1 ) .
197. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997). The material fact referred to was the
insurer's physician incentive plan.

198. Such conduct may also trigger civil liability for the filing of a false claim under the
Kennedy-Kasselbaum Bill. Health Ins. Portability and Accountability Act of 1 996, Pub. L. No. 104-

19 1 , 1 1 0 Stat. 1 936 ( 1996); see also Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at 443.
199. Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at 45 1 -52. The physician-fiduciary faces more than

civil action for the unlawful acceptance of money. As the majority of states have adopted the Model
Penal Code, many states have criminal codes finding the physician to be a fiduciary. Society has

yet to declare where the line will be drawn with respect to corruption of the physician-fiduciary with
respect to bribery. In this regard, consider the HMO use of a "withhold." A "withhold" is an

incentive to keep the physician ever mindful of the cost of medical goods and services. Specifically,
the withhold is to give the physician an incentive for denial of care. The withhold in monetary terms

may be as much as 25% of the physicians salary. At what point is the withhold large enough to

corrupt the physician's judgment sufficient to trigger criminal liability?
200. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N. W. 2d 1 68, 1 7 1 (Minn. Ct. App. I 997) (Referencing kickbacks:
"Although the putative class attempts to frame the issue before us as one involving a breach of
fiduciary duty, the gravamen of the complaint sounds in medical malpractice.").

201 . Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 237 F. Supp 96 (N.D. Oh. 1 965).
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financial incentive scheme put in place �o influence a �a.ting
doctor' s referral practices when the patient needs spec1al1zed
care is certainly a material piece of information. �s kind of
patient necessarily relies on the doctor' s advice about
treatment options. and the patie_nt must �ow w�cther. the
advice is influenced by self-serving financial cons1derat10ns
created by the health insurance provider . . . .m
Other courts have affirmed this view: "It is well accepted that patients
deserve medical opinions about treatment plans and referrals un su ll ied by
conflicting motives."203
However, fact patterns that could form the basis of a medical
malpractice action could also be used to form the basis of a breach of
fiduciary duty. The Neade Court concluded that under appropriate
circumstances an independent breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
could arise from a common set of facts with a medic al malpractice
claim.204 The benefit of pleading a case as breach of fiduciary duty rather
than medical malpractice is that breach of fiduciary duty may not be
subject to medical malpractice caps on recovery .� This potential to avoid
a medical malpractice cap has not gone unnoticed: "Plaintiffs no doubt
crafted craft Count V [involving actual and constructive fraud] with an eye
on avoiding this cap."206 Since much of what constitute s sufficient grounds
for medical malpractice against a treating physician can be rephrased as a
breach of fiduciary duty. a fair question is just how does one differen ti ate
ordinary or "garden variety" medical negligence from a breach of fiduc i ary
obligations?207
Breach of fiduci ary duty and medical malpractice can be differentiated
by whether the physician has reviewed the raw data [i.e., actuall y examined

628.
N.W.2d at

202. Shea, 107 F.3d at
203. D.A.B., 510

170 (citing Council on Ethical and Judicial Affai rs, Am.

Med.

Ass'n, Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Amercian M�dical
Association-1 986, § 8 .06 , at 3 1

(1 986) (mandating referrals be made in best interests of patient));
Physician Self-Referrals. 2 1 MOD.

see also David Burda, AMA Toughens Guidelines on

HEALTHCARE 4, 4 ( 1 99 1 ).

204. Neade v. Portes, 7 1 0 N.E.2d 4 1 8, 428 (Ill. Ct. App. 1 999).
205.

O� course, there is a downside to pleading a breach of fiduciary duty agai nst a physician.

Such an action may not be covered by medical malpractice insurance, and at present it would be
a rare physician who would have appropri ate insurance coverage for breach of fiduciary duty .
Judgin� by e reluctance of physicians to obtain stop· loss insurance as a contingency to deal with

�

the business nsks ofmanaged care medicine, it will be some time before the medical community sees
the value in insurance for breach of fiduciary duty .
206. LancasterbyLancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. l 1 37, 1 1 50 (E.D. Va.
1 997).

?

2 7 . Varity Corp. v. Howe,
.
situation).

5 1 6 U.S.

489, 514

(1996) (conunenting on this hypothetical
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the patient] and whether the medical decision was well thought out.

Medical malpractice ultimately turns on a physician ' s collection and

review of the patient' s raw data [Step 2] and the rendering of a medical
decision [Step 3]. Implicit in Step 2 is that the physician or physician's

agent must come into physical and temporal proximity to the patient.
Whether the physician lays his hands on the patient, reviews the patient' s

radiographic images, or examines the patient' s tissue under a microscope,
the treating physician' s judgment is predicated on an examination of the
patient's raw clinical data in a timely manner. The failure to examine the
patient properly, or worse, ignoring the patient' s raw data, is what forms
the bases of a medical malpractice action. Medical malpractice turns on a
poorly rationalized decision, that is a "sloppy" decision. Hence a mistaken
diagnosis, incompetent surgery, or error of omission i n the face of
adequate information could be malpractice.

In contrast, a physician's breach of fiduciary duty to a patient does not
require a close temporal physical nexus to the patient to occur. In fact, the
physician's decision to violate a fiduciary obligation may occur long
before208 or long after209 the formation of the doctor-patient relationship.
Nor does breach of fiduciary duty require that the treating physician review
the patient' s raw data. What breach of fiduciary duty does contemplate is
that an affirmative decision is made to subordinate the patient's best
interest to those interests of the physician or some third party. 2 10 Hence a
choice not to do a necessary test, not to collect adequate information, or
not to call in a specialty surgeon because of the cost of the tests would
ultimately reduce the income of a physician or an insurer, would be a
breach of fiduciary duty. Notice that breach of fiduciary duty occurs
regardless of how well the science of medicine is rationalized. In fact, a
well-rationalized scientific decision may give an index to the degree to
which the physician has reached to subordinate the patient's interest.
We realize that an "invisible hand"21 1 has always modulated the
decisions of physicians regardless of the reimbursement mechanisms or the
presence of ERISA protection. While in the managed care environment
there are incentives to reduce care,212 it must be remembered that

208. For example, the physician's conscious decision to receive all of the withhold money
under a capi tated contract could occur before the p hysician ever meets any HMO patients.
209. For example, a ph ysi ci an s decision to breach a patient s confidentiality may occur long
after the formal doctor-patient relationship has come to an end.
210. In the managed care arena, the physician subordinates the patient's interests to the
•

'

interests of the physi cian (e.g., so that the physician receives the maximum bonus or withhold) and

the insurance carrier, which attempts to li mit expenditures. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at
452.

21 1 . ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1 776).
2 1 2. Under managed care, physicians may reduce care either by flat out denial or, as the Shea
line of cases illustrates, by failure to re-evaluate the p ati ent properly. That is, managed care provides

!Vol. �J
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traditional FFS reimbursement provided incentives for excess and hence
unnecessary care. With FPS medicine the issue of breach of fiduciary duty

�

generally did not arise because the physician receive pecuniary incentives

.
to re-evaluate the patients. That is, the FFS reimbursement system
rewarded physicians for increasing the volume of care given. The financial
incentives under FPS medicine were such that a physician had no reason
to subordinate the patient's interests to the insurer's bottom line. Thus in
the FFS environment, patients were banned when a physician sub ected the

}

patient to unnecessary tests, medical treatments or surgery. 2 1 Medical
malpractice was honed to deal with harm caused by excessive and
sometimes unneeded medical care that occurred as a discrete event. In
contrast, the purpose of managed care is to ration or deny medical care. In
managed care medicine a patient may be harmed by a denial of care
decision made by a physician the patient does not even know . Moreover,
managed care systematically dissuades a treating physician from executing
Steps 4 and 5 in the reiterate medical practice cycle. These features of
managed care medicine can frustrate the application of traditional tort law
because they seek to change the standard of care . Fiduciary law is ideally
suited to provide remedies where a fiduciary is systematically corrupted
out of the presence of the beneficiary.
B.

Medical Practice and Obligations of Medical Directors

A medical director is a physician who acts as an administrator and
oversees medical care provided by an organization . Conceptually, a
medical director should exist whenever a business organization provides
medical services on a contractual b asis, as state laws generally limit the
extent to which corporations may engage in the practice of medicine . 214
Examples of such corporate provided services include: I ) staffing
emergency rooms or occupational medical care clinics, 2) medical research
involving human subjects, and 3) the administration of insurance. Many
large corporati ons have more than one medical director, with one at the
corpor�te office and one for each region or plant. These corporate medical

physicians wit� �nancial incentive not to proceed
to Step 4 in the decisio n algorithm for
.
practice of med1cme.

the

213.' Elliot S. Fisher & H . Gilbert Welch, A voiding
the Unintended Consequences of Growth
Medical Care, 28 1 JAMA 446-45 3, 449-50
( 1 999).
� 1 4. Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at
445. The prohibition on corporate practice of
.
m icme dates to �he 1 920' s. "Interestingly
, [restrictions placed on the practice o f medicine]
evo ved fro� laws intended to prevent the
practice of law by corporation s. Their purpo e
s was to
protect he i ndepcndence of the professional
' s judgment from the pressures triggered
by making
money aor the stockholders of a business."
Id.
.

m

�

!
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director positions existed long before managed care entered the health care
arena.215
Medical directors practice medicine. In the spectrum of the practice of
edicine,
the medical director' s form of practice most closely resembles
m
the hospital-based physician's practice, as the medical director does not
provide direct patient care. In contrast to the hospital based treating

physician, however, the medical director is invisible to the patient,
providing neither a consultative report nor a bill. In rendering a denial of

decision the medical director employs , with minor variation,216 the
same reiterating five-step intellectual thought process employed by the
treating physicians. But the medical director will only review the filtered
reports of the treating physicians and the patient's medical records. In
actual practice, many of these "denial-of-care" decisions are not made by
a physician but are delegated to nurses or other physician extenders to be
made by standard protocols.217 Legally, however, as only physicians may
care

make medical decisions in most states, the responsibility for a nurse or
physician extender' s medical decision flows back to the physician.2 18

Form, not substance, in the practice of medicine is what differentiates

the medical director' s practice of medicine from the treating physician ' s
practice. Key to understanding liability of HMOs is the fact that their
medical directors' decisions are medical decisions,219 while the medical
director' s administrative authority, exercised on behalf of the HMO, makes
the HMO vicariously liable for the decisions. The medical director directly

215. This article focuses on the medical director within the insurance i ndustry.
216. Procedurally, the medical director does not collect and affi rm clinical information
personally, as a treati ng physician would (i.e., the medical director does not personally execute
Steps l and 2 above), rather, the medical director generally relics on the information gathered by
the treating physician s. But after making a medical decision involving patient care (Step 3) the

medical director collects further information (Step 4) and makes remedial decisions (Step 5). The
major difference between a treating physici an ' s medical practice and medical director's medical

practi ce is the latter generally makes a decision about a population ofpatients rather than individual
patients. However, whenever the medical director makes an individual patient decision, the medical

director's practice of medicine is identical to the treating physician's practice. Accordingly, where
a medical director intervenes in a particular patient's care, the medical director should be as liable
for treatment deci si ons as the treating physician.

21 7. An HMO usually does the initial screening for denial-of-care on the basis of an opinion
rendered by a masters-level nurse or occasionally by a registered nurse. The nurse generally denies

care because it is deemed unnecessary and/or not covered by the patient s policy. Routinely, the
nurse's deci sion may be appealed to the medical director whose decision is gen erally final. See Jass
'

v.

Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1 482, 1 488-89 (1 996).
218. In California, if a physician wishes to supervise a physici an assistant, the supervising

physician is required to have a written "Delegation of Medical Services" document on file. 66 MED.

Bo. OF CAL. ACTION REP. 4 (July 1 998).

219. Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 997) ('There is no
other way to characte rize Dr. Murphy's decision: it was a ' medical' decision.").
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influences patient care when a particular pati�n� is de�ied care u�o n the
request. When a medical director makes a dec1s10n which deternun�s (at
least in part) which providers, what services, and what products �111 be
potentially available to all patients under the corporate contract � 1th the
employer, the medical director indirectly influences the care o.f patients. In
some plans, the medical director will even change medications orde�ed
directly, without operating through or with the knowledge of the treat�ng
physician. In short, the medical director has authority over both treatmg
physicians and their patients.
By exercising control over a patient's medical care, either directly or
acting through a treating physician, the medical director becomes a
common law fiduciary, independent of a direct physician-patient
relationship.220 Unlike a treating physician, who at least when operating in
the traditional FPS environment did not have to answer to a corporate
master, the medical director of necessity renders medical decisions under
a requirement of dual loyalties. The dual loyalties of the medical director
create a situation that is intrinsically antagonistic to the fiduciary doctor
1
patient relationship, which at common law demanded undivided loyalty.22

Nowhere is the tension between the dual loyalties of the medical director
clearer than in making the decision to deny medical care. Daily, medical
directors must make the difficult decision of whether to deny care and
hence favor the corporate master or provide the patient a treatment with a
low probability of success at a high cost and hence favor the patient.222
In practice, what distinguishes the medical director' s decisions from the
treating physician' s decisions are three factors. First, the medical director' s
prime interests are the administration of a group o f patients rather than the
care provided to an individual patient. Second, the medical director's
decision is final223 and, consequently, such decisions are more important

220. There are no rituals or talismanic expressions which create a physician patient
relationship. Objectively, the creation of the physician-patient relationship occurs when a contract
has been formed; that is, when the patient asks for assistance and the physician accepts the patient.
See, e.g., Clanton v. von Haam, 340 S.E.2d 627 , 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Davis v. Weiskoff, 439

N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982). But this begs the question how the parties to such a contract
rec? gnize the process of offer and acceptance. From a practical point of view, the physician and
patient recognize that a relatio n sh i p is formed when the physi ci an offers an independent medical
decision or judgment and the patient relies on the physician' s decision. This reliance is the basis
for the physician-patient relationship and the accompanying fiduciary obligations. For many cases,
�he relationship arises from status relationships, such as the physician agreeing to treat all patients
m a health plan or to treat all patients entering an emergency room.

22 1 . Donovan v. B ierwi rth 538 F. Supp. 463, 469 (E.D. N.Y. 1981).
,

222 If the treatment under review by a medical director had a high probability of provi di n g
:
.
a cu re (1.e., tt w� well accepted by the medical community as appropriate) then it is assumed that
.
the issue of dental-of-care would not arise.

�2: .

For ERIS� self-insured plans, medical care and decisions made by an insurer

admm1strator can u lti mately be appealed directly to the employer.
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to the patient than the treating physician ' s decision. And third, the medical
director only examines a patient' s medical record, never the patient. Unlike
treating physicians, when a patient is banned by a medical director's
decisionmaking which results in a wrongful denial of care and the patient
sustains bodily injury, the patient may not have a "garden variety" medical
malpractice remedy against the medical director.
If the patient-plaintiff filed a traditional medical malpractice action
against a medical director, the plaintiff would face several hurdles. The
plaintiff would have to demonstrate a doctor-patient relationship. Other
than the opinion in Murphy v. Board ofMedical Examiners,224 there is not
clear case law that places a medical director in a doctor-patient
relationship. Also, a plaintiff suing the medical director would have a
causation problem. Arguably, the treating physician' s conduct might be
viewed as an independent act which "cut off' the medical director' s
liability. In contrast, if the medical director was sued for breach of
fiduciary duty, all that would have to be shown is that the medical
director's decision impacted that plaintiff and in forming that decision the
medical director subordinated the patient' s interest. The latter is simple to
understand because the medical director, by necessity, operates in a world
of divided loyalties. After the fact, when a patient has sustained an injury
because a medical service was denied, it will be very difficult to
demonstrate that the medical service was unnecessary where it is also
shown that the medical director was serving more than one master.
In short, the medical director i s actively engaged in the practice of
medicine, and, like the treating physician, the medical director may make
bad decisions based on either incompetence (that is medical malpractice),
or the medical director may make decisions that subordinate the patient' s

interests to the plan's interest (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty) . When a
physician assumes a medical director' s position, he or she does not cease
to be a physician. The common law fiduciary duties are no less onerous on
a physician because the physician functions as a medical director rather
than a treating physician. The importance of the medical director' s position
for purposes of HMO litigation lies i n the ubiquitous nature of the position
itself. The medical director position exists whenever a corporation
oversees medical services. As such, the medical director position is the
legal nexus between all HMO plans and their patients and should provide
a common path for regulation, irrespective of the organizational structures
of the plan.225 The medical director' s position serves as a portal for

224 . 949 P.2d 503, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. I 997).
225. Thomas W. Waldron, Rehrmann Backs Effort on HMO Discipline, B ALT. SUN, June I I ,
1 998, at 6B. ''The General Assembly defeated a bill . . . to put medical directors of HMOs under
the same disciplinary scrutiny as doctors. " Id. Subsequently, Maryland has placed medical directors
under the control of the insurance board.

See

MD. CODE ANN.

§

I 5- 1 Oc-02( 1 )( 1 999).
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n for breach of
assigning liability to virtually any business organizatio
fiduciary duty based upon administrative malfeasance.

C.

Damages for Breach of Common Law Fiduciary Duty

Under the common law, remedies for breach of fiduciary duty were
equitable and "endeavor[ed] as far as possible to replace the parties in the
same situation as they would have been in, if no breach of trust had been
committed."226 Historically, equitable remedies were differentiated from
legal remedies. ''Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal
relief,"227 whereas equitable remedies are classically "inj unctions or
restitution."228 The issue, then, is when a patient sustains injury due to

medical director' s or treating physician's breach of fiduciary duty, what is
the appropriate relief for such patients?

1 . Equitable Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Equitable relief is "limited to those remedies that were typically
available in equity, i .e. injunctions, mandamus and restitution."229
Classically then, equitable remedies were non-pecuniary orders or awards
which were granted in order to make an aggrieved party "whole." A listing

of the more common equitable remedies available for breach of fiduciary
duty include:230

( 1 ) Injunctive and declaratory relief.
(2) Pre-judgment interest and attachment of assets.
(3) Forfeiture of beneficial interest by breaching fiduciary.
(4) Imposition of a constructive tru st .
(5) Compulsion of payment owed.
(6) Restitution of misappropriated funds .

226. Menens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J., di ssenting) (quoting J .
Hill, Annotation, Remedy at Law Available to Beneficiary of Trust as Exclusive Remedy in Equity,

171 A.L.R. 429 (1947)).
227. Id. at 255 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 1 89, 196 (1974)); see also Teamsters v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 588, 570-01 (1 990); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 1 . 1 p.3 (1973).
228. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 225.
229. 29 U.S.C.S. § l 132note (1997} (citingCunningham v. Dun &BradstreetPlan Servs., 889
F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Miss. 1995)).
230. This compilation was extracted from Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, What constitutes
"other app rop riate equitable relief' under §§ 502(a)(3)(b), 502(a)(5)(8)
of the Employee
Retir ment Income S cu�ty Act (29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1 132(aX3)(B), J J32(a)(5)(
b)) which may be
�
�
obtained to redress violation or to enforce provisions, of {the] Act, 98 A.L.R. 705
( 1 997).
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(7) Removal of fiduciary.
Implicit i n this enumeration of equitable remedies is that to be effective
in providing relief for breach of fiduciary duty the contents of the trust
must not only be identifiable, but the contents of the trust also must be
recoverable or replaceable. That i s , for equitable relief to make the party
"whole," the property in question needs to be fungible. Not surprisingly,
equitable remedies have worked well where a fiduciary has defrauded a
trust, such as a pension fund or where the trustee has breached the
confidence of the beneficiary for profit,231 because in both of these
circumstances the asset in question (money) is both seizable and fungible.
However, equity cannot, by itself, make whole a party who has sustained
either bodily injury or wrongful death because judicial fiat cannot replace
life or limb; neither life nor limb tangible or fungible. Accordingly, in the
HMO environment, when breach of fiduciary duty leads to wrongful death or
bodily injury, if the remedies are limited to those found in equity, then a
worthy plaintiff s remedies are tantamount to no remedy at all.

2. Compensatory Monetary Awards for Breach of Common Law
Fiduciary Duty

The common law of equity ' s aversion to granting monetary awards for
breach of fiduciary duty has never been absolute.232 Under many situations
an "equity court could 'establish purely legal rights and grant legal
remedies which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority. "'233

While equity recognized that monetary awards only need to be calculated
with mathematical precision,234 monetary awards were often needed to
"make the victims of the breach whole."235 Accordingly, compensatory
monetary awards have been provided for breach of fiduciary duty arising
under protean circumstances.236 Although money may not make the victim

23 1 . Coming regulations promulgated under authority of the Kcnnedy-Kasselbaum Act, Pub.

L. No. 1 04- 1 9 1 , 1 10 Stat 1 936 ( 1996) are expected to have civil and criminal penalties for breach

of confidentiality associated with data contained in electronic medical records that are mandated

by this Act.

232. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 46 3 U.S. 206, 226 ( 1 983) (mandating compensation
for violations of fiduciary duties).
233. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (qu oti ng I JoHN N . POMEROY. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1 8 1 ,
at 257 (5th ed. 1 94 1 )) .
234. In re: Club Dev. & Mgmt. Corp.

v.

Leonard, U.S. App. LEXIS 6 1 75, *9 ( 1 9 9 1 ).

235. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 266 (White, J., di ssenting).

236. Thayer v. Domiano, 5 1 1 P.2d 84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that monetary damages

may be collected for misrepresentations); see also Gilbert

v.

Meyers, 362 F. Supp. 1 68 (1973)

(holding that notic e that appli cation of a constructive trust can provide a vehicle for compensatory

monetary award for violation of the security law); Clancy v. State Bar of Calif., 454 P.2d 329, 3 3 6
(Cal. 1969) (ordering attorney to provide a restitutionary monetary award fo r breach o f fiduciary
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of bodily injury or wrongful death whole, money is a more appropriate

form of equitable relief where there is bodily injury or wrongful death.
If compensatory monetary damages are t? be awarded for patients
.
injured by a medical director's breach of fiduciary duty, then the question
arises as to how such damages should be calculated. We would fa�or
determination of monetary awards for administrate malfeasance resultmg
in bodily in ury or wrongful death to be determined in a manner analogous
to tort law, 37 because such a policy would minimize the need to redress a
medical malpractice action as a breach of fiduciary duty for treating
physicians. Conversely, even if a medical malpractice case were redressed
as a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, by granting a monetary award
in a manner similar to medical malpractice, the discrepancy in awards
would be minimized. Such a policy would also make a medical director
liable to the same extent as a treating physician for a similar injury.
Moreover, having a strong deterrent in place to check the medical
director' s behavior would serve to remind the medical directors that they
are first physicians and their decisions have the potential to cause real
physical harm.

J:

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Physicians as primary treating physicians are liable when their
decisions violate state medical malpractice standards or their state common
law fiduciary duties. Pegram makes clear that physicians who also have
administrative roles in HMOs are not covered by BRISA when making
medical decisions and thus are also subject to the same liability as primary
treating physicians. To the extent that treating physicians and medical
directors are controlled by an HMO, or are found to be ostensible agents
of an HMO, the HMO will share in their liability.238 Thus HMOs and other

duty); Local no. 92, Int'l Ass ' n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Af'L...CIO v.
Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1 967) (allowing monetary damages in addition to attorney fees); R.C.
Gluck & Co. v. Tanke!, 2 1 1 N.Y.S .2d 602 (N.Y. App. D iv. 1 96 1 ) (holding that even absent fraud ,
beneficiary may recei ve a monetary adjustment after fiduciary provides an accounting).
237. The common law also allowed for the potential granting of punitive damages. "Although

many older cases state that courts lack power in equity actions to award punitive damages, this
increasingly [is an] antiquated view." Schoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899, 9 1 3 (S.D.N.Y.

1 987) (citations omitted); see also Weems v. Jefferson-Pi lot Lite Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 905, 9 1 4
(Ala. 1 995). In principle, we would favor the awardin1; of punitive damages in egregious cases
where a physician's breach of fiduciary duty led to bodily injury. However, a discussion of punitive
damages for breach of fiduciary duty is beyond the scope of this Article.
238. Recently, Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill. , Inc., 7 1 9 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1 999), has

extended Lancaster's allowance for vicarious liability to reach all health plans. In Petrovich, the
plaintiff alleged that the physician was negligent in failing to make a proper referral. Id. at 760.
After experienc n intra-oral pain, the plaintiff went to see his PCP, who then referred the plaintiff

��

to an

ENT spec1ahst. /d. at 761 . Although the specialist recommended a further work-up, in what
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managed care organization s that attempt to control medical care
decisionmaking will have increased liability through the liability of thei r

physicians. This should create pressure to improve patient care. At the
same time, it will give plans that stay within the court's notion of the reach
of ERISA an economic advantage through continuation of the ERISA
preemption of state law regulation. Such plans must give up their control
of physician decisionmaking, which reduces their ability to reduce costs,
and must not hold the physicians out as their agents, which can hurt them
in marketing. If the cost of litigation is too high, then there will be an
incentive for plans to forgo the benefits of managing physician
decisionmaking Plans that choose this route will not give up cost controls.
They will shift the cost of insurance to the physicians through capitation
agreements that do not involve the plan in the decisions about individual
patients. If they then though forgo medical director review of the decisions,
that is, forgo quality control, they will escape state liability by explicitly
ignoring quality of care issues. This threat must be addressed by state
insurance regulators to avoid the paradox of avoiding liability by giving up
qu ality control.
.

is at present a recurrent pattern of conduct for PCPs in the managed care environment, the PCP
overruled the specialist and clinical evaluation was terminated. Id. Over a year later, the plaintiff
was found to have carcinoma of the tongue, which had spread into the pharynx and thereby,

compromised any potential curative surgical procedures. Id. The court concluded that absent ERIS A
preemption protections, an HMO "may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its
independent-contractor physicians under both the doctrines of apparent authority and implied
authority." Id. at 775. This HMO liability is not based upon improper administrative action of the
HMO , but rather the conduct of the physician providing medical service for the plan. ERISA
preemption applies to harm to patients as a result of the administrative action. In contrast, delivery

of medical service is not covered under ERISA. Thus, to the extent that a plan integrates
administrative and medical services, it will be vicariously liable for the negligence of the medical
servi ce providers. This should extend to all plans with "branded" medical groups or other forms
of integration of medical and plan administrative functions.

